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Abstract
The theory CDL of Conditional Doxastic Logic is the single-agent version of Board’s multi-agent theory
BRSIC of conditional belief. CDL may be viewed as a version of AGM belief revision theory in which
Boolean combinations of revisions are expressible in the language. We introduce a theory JCDL of Justified
Conditional Doxastic Logic that replaces conditional belief formulas Bψϕ by expressions t :ψϕ made up
of a term t whose syntactic structure suggests a derivation of the belief ϕ after revision by ψ. This allows
us to think of terms t as reasons justifying a belief in various formulas after a revision takes place. We
show that JCDL-theorems are the exact analogs of CDL-theorems, and that this result holds the other way
around as well. This allows us to think of JCDL as a theory of revisable justified belief.
1 Introduction
Conditional Doxastic Logic is Baltag and Smets’ [4] name for a single-agent version of Board’s [5] multi-agent
theory of conditional belief BRSIC. CDL has formulas Bψϕ to express that the agent believes ϕ conditional
on ψ. As we will see, CDL has a certain relationship with the “AGM theory” of belief revision due to due to
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson [1]. So we may also think of Bψϕ as say that the agent will believe
ϕ after revising her belief state by successfully incorporating the information that ψ is true. As with AGM
theory, CDL assumes that conditionalization (i.e., revision) is always successful: the agent is to assume that
the incoming information ψ is completely trustworthy and therefore update her belief state by consistently
incorporating this incoming information. If before the revision she holds beliefs that imply ¬ψ, then she
must give up these beliefs so that she will come to believe ψ after the revision takes place. The question
then is how to do this in general.
The models of CDL are “plausibility models.” These are very close to Grove’s “system of spheres” for
AGM theory [6]. As we will see, we can view the conditionalization/revision process either from the semantic
perspective, as a definite operation on plausibility models, or from the syntactic perspective, as an axiomatic
formulation analogous to the postulate-based approach of AGM. However, it is perhaps simplest to start
with the semantic perspective.
2 Plausibility models
Definition 2.1 (Plausibility models). Let P be a set of propositional letters. A plausibility model is a
structure M = (W,≤, V ) consisting of a nonempty set W of “worlds,” a preorder (i.e., a reflexive and
transitive binary relation) ≤ on W , and a propositional valuation V : W → ℘(P) mapping each world w to
the set V (w) of propositional letters true at w. We call ≤ a plausibility relation on W . In terms of ≤, we
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define the converse relation ≥, the strict version <, the strict converse relation >, and the various negations
of these (denoted by writing a slash through the symbol to be negated) as usual. ' denotes the relation
' := (≥ ∩ ≤) of equi-plausibility. A pointed plausibility model is a pair (M,w) consisting of a plausibility
model M and the point w, itself a world in M . Notation: for each w ∈W , we define the set
w↓ := {x ∈W | x ≤ w} .
x ≤ y read, “x is no less plausible than y.” According to this reading, if we think of ≤ as a “less than
or equal to” relation, then it is the “lesser” elements that are more plausible. Therefore, if ≤ is a well-order
and S is a nonempty set of worlds, minS is the set of worlds that are the most plausble in S. While it may
at first seem counterintuitive to the uninitiated, this convention of “lesser is more plausible” is nevertheless
standard in Belief Revision Theory.1
We think of the plausibility relation as describing the judgments of an unnamed agent: for each pair
of worlds (x, y), she either judges one world to be more plausible than the other or the two to be of equal
plausibility. Plausibility models for multiple agents have a number of plausibility relations, one for each
agent. For present purposes, we restrict attention to the single-agent case, though we say more about the
multi-agent situation later.
Definition 2.2 (Plausibility model terminology). Let M = (W,≤, V ) be a plausibility model.
• To say M is finite means W is finite.
• To say M is connected means that for each x ∈W , we have cc(x) = W , where
cc(x) := {y ∈ x | x(≥ ∪≤)+y}
is the connected component of x and (≥∪≤)+ is the transitive closure of ≥∪≤.2 A connected component
is a subset S ⊆W for which there exists an x ∈W such that cc(x) = S.
• To say M is well-founded means ≤ is well-founded: for each nonempty S ⊆W , the set
minS := {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S : y 6< x}
of minimal elements of S is nonempty.
• To say that a set S ⊆W of worlds is smooth in M means that for each world x ∈ S, either x ∈ min(S)
or there exists y ∈ min(S) such that y < x. Given a collection Γ ⊆ ℘(W ) of sets of worlds, to say
that M is smooth with respect to Γ means that every S ∈ Γ is smooth in M . To say that M is smooth
means that M is smooth with respect to ℘(W ).
• To say that M is total means that ≤ is total on W : for each (x, y) ∈W ×W , we have x ≤ y or y ≤ x.
• To say M is well-ordered (equivalently, that M is a well-order) means that ≤ is well-ordered (i.e., it
is total and well-founded).
• To say that M is locally total means that ≤ is total on each connected component : for each w ∈ W
and (x, y) ∈ cc(w)× cc(w), we have x ≤ y or y ≤ x.
1This convention stems from the notion of “Grove spheres” [6]: given a well-order, worlds are arranged so that they sit on
the surface of a number of concentric spheres. Worlds of strictly greater plausibility are assigned to spheres with strictly shorter
radii, and equi-plausible worlds are assigned to the same sphere. In this way, the most plausible worlds sit on the surface of the
innermost sphere, which has the minimum radius. Similarly, if we restrict attention to a nonempty set S of worlds, then we
“recenter” the sphere around S. By this we mean that we create a new system of spheres consisting of just those worlds in S.
After doing so, the most plausible worlds again sit on the surface of the innermost sphere, which again has the minimum radius.
2The transitive closure of a binary relation R is the smallest extension R+ ⊇ R satisfying the property that xR+y and yR+z
together imply xR+z.
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• To say M is locally well-ordered (equivalently, that M is a local well-order) means that ≤ is locally
well-ordered (i.e., it is well-founded and total on each connected component).
To say that a pointed plausibility model (M,w) satisfies one of the model-applicable adjectives above means
that M itself satisfies the adjective in question.
Theorem 2.3 (Relationships between terminology). Let M = (W,≤, V ) be a plausibility model and S ⊆W .
1. If M is finite, then M is well-founded.
2. If M is locally well-ordered, and S is a connected component, then
minS = {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S : x ≤ y} .
3. If M is well-ordered, then minS = {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S : x ≤ y}.
4. M is well-founded iff M is smooth.
5. M is well-ordered iff M is smooth and total.
6. M is locally well-ordered iff M is smooth and locally total.
Proof. See the appendix.
From now on, in this paper we will restrict ourselves to locally well-ordered plausibility models, unless
otherwise specified.
3 Conditional Doxastic Logic
3.1 Language and semantics
Definition 3.1 (LCDL). LetP be a fixed set of propositional letters. The language of Conditional Doxastic
Logic consists of the set of LCDL formulas ϕ formed by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | (ϕ→ ϕ) | Bϕϕ p ∈P
The logical constant > (for truth) and the various familiar Boolean connectives are defined by the usual
abbreviations. Other important abbreviations: B(ϕ|ψ) denotes Bψϕ, and Bϕ denotes B>ϕ.
The formula Bψϕ is read, “Conditional on ψ, the agent believes ϕ.” Intuitively, this means that each of
the most plausible ψ-worlds satisfies ϕ. The forthcoming semantics will clarify this further. The basic idea
is that a belief conditional on ψ is a belief the agent would hold were she to minimally revise her beliefs so
that she comes to believe ψ.
Definition 3.2 (LCDL-truth). Let M = (W,≤, V ) be a locally well-ordered plausibility model. We define
a binary satisfaction relation |= between locally well-ordered pointed plausibility models (M,w) (written
without surrounding parentheses) and LCDL-formulas and we define a function J−K : LCDL → ℘(W ) as
follows.
• JϕKM := {v ∈W |M,v |= ϕ}. The subscript M may be suppressed.
• M,w 6|= ⊥.
• M,w |= p iff p ∈ V (w) for p ∈P.
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• M,w |= ϕ→ ψ iff M,w 6|= ϕ or M,w |= ψ.
• M,w |= Bψϕ iff for all x ∈ cc(w), we have
x↓ ∩ JψK = ∅ or ∃y ∈ x↓ ∩ JψK : y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK .
Bψϕ holds at w iff for every world connected to w that has an equally or more plausible ψ-world y,
the ψ-worlds that are equally or more plausible than y satisfy ϕ.
We extend the above so that we may have sets S ⊆ LCDL of formulas on the right-hand side:
M,w |= S means M,w |= ϕ for each ϕ ∈ S .
Also, we will have occasion to use the following notion of local consequence: given a set S ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LCDL of
formulas and writing P∗ to denote the class of pointed plausibility models,
S |=` ϕ means ∀(M,w) ∈ P∗ : M,w |= S implies M,w |= ϕ .
Finally, we write M |= ϕ to mean that M, v |= ϕ for each world v in M (“ϕ is valid within M”).
Remark 3.3 (Knowledge). Baltag and Smets [4] read the abbreviation
Kϕ := B¬ϕ⊥
as “the agent knows ϕ.” This notion of “knowledge” is based on the rejection of a proposed belief revision.
In particular, Kϕ = B¬ϕ⊥ says that the most plausible ¬ϕ-worlds are ⊥-worlds. The propositional constant
⊥ for falsehood is true nowhere, so this amounts to us saying that the agent does not consider any ¬ϕ-worlds
possible. Hence all the worlds she considers possible are ϕ-worlds. It is in this sense that we say she “knows”
that ϕ is true: she will not revise her beliefs by ¬ϕ (on pain of contradiction). It is easy to see that the
semantics ensures that K so-defined is an S5 modal operator: knowledge is closed under classical implication,
what is known is true, it is known what is known, it is known what is not known, and all validities are known.
In well-founded plausibility models, belief in ϕ conditional on ψ is equivalent to having ϕ true at the
most plausible ψ-worlds that are within the connected component of the actual world. And if the models
are well-ordered, then we can omit mention of the connected component.
Theorem 3.4 (LCDL-truth in well-founded models). Let M = (W,≤, V ) be a plausibility model.
(a) If M is well-founded: M,w |= Bψϕ ⇔ minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK.
(b) If M is well-ordered: M,w |= Bψϕ ⇔ minJψK ⊆ JϕK.
Proof. See the appendix for the proof of (a). For (b), if M is well-ordered, then ≤ is total and therefore
cc(w) = W for each w ∈W . Apply (a).
The intended models for CDL are the well-ordered (and hence well-founded) plausibility models.
Definition 3.5 (LCDL-validity). To say that a LCDL-formula ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ, means that we have
M |= ϕ for each well-ordered plausibility model M .
As per Theorem 3.4, restricting validity to the well-orders allows us to read Bψϕ as follows: “the most
plausible ψ-worlds satisfy ϕ.” While the intended models for CDL are well-ordered, and validity is defined
accordingly (as per Definition 3.5), the following theorem shows that locally well-ordered plausibility models
would suffice.
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Axiom Schemes
(CL) Schemes for Classical Propositional Logic
(K) Bψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ (Bψϕ1 → Bψϕ2)
(Succ) Bψψ
(IEa) Bψϕ→ (Bψ∧ϕχ↔ Bψχ)
(IEb) ¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψ∧ϕχ↔ Bψ(ϕ→ χ))
(PI) Bψχ→ BϕBψχ
(NI) ¬Bψχ→ Bϕ¬Bψχ
(WCon) Bψ⊥ → ¬ψ
Rules
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
(MP)
ψ
ϕ
(MN)
Bψϕ
ψ ↔ ψ′
(LE)
Bψϕ↔ Bψ′ϕ
Table 1. The theory CDL0, a single-agent variant of Board’s theory BRSIC [5]
Theorem 3.6 (LCDL-validity with respect to local well-orders). Let PL be the class of locally well-ordered
plausibility models. For each ϕ ∈ LCDL, we have:
|= ϕ iff ∀M ∈ PL, M |= ϕ .
Proof. Right to left (“if”): obvious. Left to right (“only if”): assume |= ϕ and take M = (W,≤, V ) ∈ PL
and a world w ∈W . Let M ′ be the sub-model of M = (W ′,≤′, V ′) obtained by restricting to cc(w):
W ′ = cc(w), ≤′=≤ ∩(W ′ ×W ′), V ′(v) = V (v) for v ∈W ′.
Since M ∈ PL, it follows that M ′ is well-ordered and therefore, since |= ϕ, we have M ′, w |= ϕ. It follows
by a straightforward induction on the construction of LCDL-formulas θ that M
′, w |= θ iff M,w |= θ.
Hence M,w |= ϕ. Since w ∈ W and M ∈ PL were chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that M |= ϕ for each
M ∈ PL.
3.2 Board’s theory BRSIC and CDL0
The Hilbert theory of Conditional Doxastic Logic was first studied by Board [5] under the name BRSIC.
Baltag and Smets [4] subsequently developed various alternative axiomatizations and extensions and intro-
duced the name Conditional Doxastic Logic. The single-agent version of Board’s theory BRSIC is equivalent
to what we call CDL0.
Definition 3.7 (CDL0 theory). CDL0 is defined in Table 1.
CDL0 is actually a simplification of BRSIC. In particular, BRSIC is a multi-agent theory for a nonempty
set A of agents using a language similar to LCDL except that it has as primitives both conditional belief
Bψa ϕ for each agent a ∈ A and unconditional belief Baϕ for each agent a ∈ A. Since the BRSIC axiom
Baϕ ↔ B>a ϕ (“Triv”) requires that unconditional belief be equivalent to conditional belief based on a
tautological conditional, we have decided upon a streamlined language that contains conditional belief only.
This allowed us to define away Board’s axiom Triv in the following way (in Definition 3.1): let Baϕ abbreviate
B>a ϕ. We have also renamed some of Board’s axioms and rules: his Taut is now called (CL), his Dist is
now called (K), his IE(a) is now called (IEa), his IE(b) is now called (IEb), his TPI is now called (PI), his
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NPI is now called (NI), his RE is now called (MN), and all of his other axiom names have been enclosed in
parenthesis. Finally, what we call (WCon) is the contrapositive of what Board called WCon. Restricting to
a single-agent setting and thereby dropping subscripted agent names, we obtain the theory CDL0.
Remark 3.8 (Multi-agent CDL0). A multi-agent version of CDL0 is obtained by making trivial modifications
to the language, axiomatization, and semantics of CDL0. In particular, for a nonempty set A of agents, the
multi-agent languageL ACDL is like the single-agent languageLCDL except that each conditional belief operator
Bψ is replaced by a number of operators Bψa , one for each agent a ∈ A. The multi-agent theory CDLA0 is
obtained by adding a metavariable agent subscript a to each of the belief operators in Table 1. The models of
CDLA0 are multi-agent plausibility models: these are like single-agent plausibility models presented above (in
Definition 2.1) except that the preorder ≤ is replaced by a preorder ≤a for each agent a ∈ A. The definition
of truth for L ACDL on these models is like that in Definition 3.2 except that the meaning of M,w |= Bψa ϕ
is changed so as to refer to the preorder ≤a. Validity is defined with respect to the class of multi-agent
plausibility models satisfying the property that each ≤a is locally well-ordered.
So, in essence, the multi-agent version consists of multiple single agent versions such that each agent’s
conditional beliefs are always restricted to the worlds connected (for that agent) to the given world w
currently under consideration. It is clear that restricting to one agent a yields a framework that is equivalent
to the version of CDL0 we have presented here.
We note that the multi-agent version allows us to describe what one agent conditionally believes about
what another agent conditionally believes. This is feature of interest in a wide variety of applications.
However, from the technical perspective, the difference between the single- and multi-agent frameworks does
not amount to too much in the way of mathematical shenanigans. It therefore suffices to indicate, as we have
here, how the multi-agent version is obtained from the single-agent version and then restrict our study to the
single-agent version. Of course, one may consult Board [5] for the fully specified account of the multi-agent
theory BRSIC.
3.3 The theory CDL
It will be our task in this paper to develop a version of Conditional Doxastic Logic with justifications in
the tradition of Justification Logic [2]. We will say more about this later, but for now it suffices to say
that justifications in this tradition are meant to encode the individual reasoning steps that the agent uses
to support her belief in one statement based on justifications she has for beliefs in other statements. In this
way, justifications are supposed to present a stepwise explanation for how the agent derives complex beliefs
from more basic ones. It is in this sense that justifications are “proof-like.”
In order to make this precise, we require an axiomatization of Conditional Doxastic Logic that is more
perspicious than is CDL0 with regard to the ways in which conditional beliefs obtain. In particular, (IEa),
(IEb), and (LE) are powerful principles that in fact encode a number of more basic principles and, as such,
these powerful principles compress a number of reasoning steps into a small number of postulates. This is
especially obvious with (LE): a belief conditional ψ may be replaced by a provably equivalent conditional ψ′
in one step, which does not reflect the complexity of the derivation that was used to prove the equivalence
ψ ↔ ψ′. From the point of view of the Justification Logic tradition, wherein justifications should explain
in a stepwise fashion how one conditional belief follows from another, this is undesirable. Intuitively, if the
agent believes ϕ conditional on ψ, then the reason she believes ϕ conditional on a provably equivalent ψ′
depends crucially on the reasoning as to why ψ′ is in fact equivalent to ψ. If pi1 and a more complex pi2
are proofs of this equivalence, then an agent who bases her belief on the more complex pi2 should have a
correspondingly more complex justification witnessing her belief. We therefore require an alternative but
equivalent axiomatization of the theory CDL0 that makes such stepwise reasoning operations more explicit.
The exact criteria we seek for such a theory are not precisely defined but are based on the authors’ experience
in working in the Justification Logic tradition. We call the theory we have settled upon CDL, and later we
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Axiom Schemes
(CL) Schemes for Classical Propositional Logic
(K) Bψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ (Bψϕ1 → Bψϕ2)
(Succ) Bψψ
(KM) Bψ⊥ → Bψ∧ϕ⊥
(RM) ¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψχ→ Bψ∧ϕχ)
(Inc) Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψ(ϕ→ χ)
(Comm) Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bϕ∧ψχ
(PI) Bψχ→ BϕBψχ
(NI) ¬Bψχ→ Bϕ¬Bψχ
(WCon) Bψ⊥ → ¬ψ
Rules
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
(MP)
ψ
ϕ
(MN)
Bψϕ
Table 2. The theory CDL
will explain how this theory gives rise to a theory of Conditional Doxastic Logic with justifications.
Definition 3.9 (CDL theory). CDL is defined in Table 2.
The scheme (CL) of Classical Logic and the rule (MP) of Modus Ponens tell us that CDL is an extension
of Classical Propositional Logic. The rule (MN) of Modal Necessitation tells us that derivable formulas hold
in all conditional belief states.
Scheme (K) is just Kripke’s axiom for our conditional belief operator Bψ. The scheme (Succ) of Success
says that every belief revision is always successful: if the agent revises her belief based on the information
that ψ, then she will always arrive in a belief state in which ψ is one of her beliefs.
Making use of the definition of knowledge Kϕ := B¬ϕ⊥ from Remark 3.3, we can look at the following
special case of the scheme (KM) of Knowledge Monotonicity :
B¬ψ⊥ → B¬ψ∧¬ϕ⊥ .
Since ¬¬ψ is equivalent to ψ and ¬(¬ψ ∧¬ϕ) is equivalent to ψ ∨ϕ, we may interpret the above instance of
(KM) as telling us that knowledge is closed under disjunction: if ψ is known, then so is ψ ∨ ϕ. But another
interpretation perhaps better explains the word “Monotonicity” in the name of this scheme. Returning now
to the official formulation
Bψ⊥ → Bψ∧ϕ⊥
of (KM), this scheme tells us that if we can conclude that a belief state conditional on ψ is contradictory,
then conjunctively adding any further information ϕ yields a belief state conditional on ψ ∧ ϕ that is
still contradictory. Accordingly, the belief state is unchanged by the conjunctive addition of any further
conditional information, and so the belief state is trivially “monotonic” in the conjunctive addition of
conditional information.
The scheme (RM) of Rational Monotonicity permits a more subtle kind of conjunctive addition. This
scheme,
¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψχ→ Bψ∧ϕχ) ,
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says that if ϕ is consistent with the belief state conditional on ψ, then we may conjunctively add ϕ to
our conditional without losing any beliefs from the original belief state. This is a non-trivial monotonicity:
incorporating the information ϕ by forming the conditional ψ ∧ ϕ yields a belief state that includes all the
beliefs from the belief state conditional on ψ, but it may also include more.
The scheme (Inc) of Inclusion says that a belief state conditional on ψ includes every χ implied by ϕ
whenever the belief state conditional on the conjunction ψ ∧ϕ includes χ. The scheme (Comm) of Commu-
tativity says that the belief state conditional on a conjunction is invariant to the ordering of the conjuncts.
The schemes (PI) of Positive Introspection and (NI) or Negative Introspection tell us that conditional beliefs
are identical in all belief states. The scheme (WCon) of Weak Consistency tells us that belief revision is
consistent with the actual state of affairs: if a revision by ψ yields a contradictory belief state, then ψ cannot
be true.
Remark 3.10 (Classical reasoning (CR), modal reasoning (MR)). When discussing derivation in CDL, we
will often suppress elementary reasoning steps familiar from the study of normal modal logics. Toward this
end, “classical reasoning,” which may be denoted by (CR), refers to a derivation with one or more steps
that makes use solely of (CL) and (MP). “Modal reasoning,” which may be denoted by (MR), refers to a
derivation with one or more steps that makes use solely of (CL), (K), (MP), and (MN).
Theorem 3.11 (CDL-theorems). The following schemes of (Cut), Cautious Monotonicity (CM), (Taut),
(And), (Or), Positive Reduction (PR), and Negative Reduction (NR) are all derivable in CDL:
(Cut) Bψϕ→ (Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψχ)
(CM) Bψϕ→ (Bψχ→ Bψ∧ϕχ)
(Taut) Bϕ↔ B>ϕ
(And) Bψϕ1 → (Bψϕ2 → Bψ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2))
(Or) Bψ1ϕ→ (Bψ2ϕ→ Bψ1∨ψ2ϕ)
(PR) BϕBψχ↔ (Bϕ⊥ ∨Bψχ)
(NR) Bϕ¬Bψχ↔ (Bϕ⊥ ∨ ¬Bψχ)
Also, the following rules of (Left) Logical Equivalence (LE), Right Weakening (RW), and Supraclassicality
(SC) are all derivable in CDL:
ψ ↔ ψ′
(LE)
Bψχ↔ Bψ′χ
χ→ χ′
(RW)
Bψχ→ Bψχ′
ψ → χ
(SC)
Bψχ
Proof. See the appendix.
The following result shows that CDL and CDL0 derive the same theorems and therefore that these theories
are identical.
Theorem 3.12 (CDL-CDL0 equivalence). For each ϕ ∈ LCDL:
`CDL ϕ iff `CDL0 ϕ .
Proof. See the appendix.
That CDL is sound and complete with respect to the class of well-ordered plausibility follows by The-
orem 3.12 and the results in Board’s work [5]. However, we provide a full proof of this in the appendix
because the details will be useful when we consider a justified version of CDL.
Theorem 3.13 (CDL soundness and completeness; [5]). For each ϕ ∈ LCDL:
`CDL ϕ iff |= ϕ .
Proof. See the appendix.
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4 AGM Belief Revision
The most influential theory of belief change is due to Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson [1]. Their
theory, commonly called to the “AGM theory,” takes the view that an agent’s belief state (or “database”)
is represented by a deductively closed set of sentences T called a “belief set.” The agent is understood to
believe exactly those sentences in her belief set T , and various operators on T are used to describe various
kinds of changes in her belief state. Of particular interest is the revision operator, now often denoted using
the symbol “ ∗ ”. This operator takes new information in the form of a sentence ψ and produces another
belief set T ∗ ψ that contains ψ. Intuitively, the revision operation assumes that the incoming information
ψ is completely trustworthy and so it should be incorporated into the database. However, simply adding ψ
and taking the deductive closure, forming the expansion
T + ψ := Cn(T ∪ {ψ}) (1)
using an assumed consequence-closure operator Cn(−) underlying the setting, might lead to an inconsistent
belief set. By this it is meant that T + ψ might be logically inconsistent according to the logic governing
Cn(−). Therefore, we cannot simply equate revision with expansion but must do something more clever so
that the revised belief set T ∗ ψ not only contains ψ but is also consistent whenever ψ is consistent.
Instead of providing an exact procedure for computing revision, the AGM approach is “postulate based”:
a number of axiomatic postulates are provided, some intuitive justification is given as to why a revision
operator should satisfy each of the postulates, and any operation on belief sets that satisfies all of the
postulates is said to be an AGM revision operator. So in principle, there are many revision operators, and
each is to be studied from an axiomatic point of view using the AGM revision postulates.
Following the exposition of AGM theory from [7] (but with some minor modifications), we begin with a
set P of propositional letters (usually countable). The set LCPL of formulas (the “propositional formulas”
or “formulas of Classical Propositional Logic”) consists of those expressions that can be built up from
the propositional letters and the Boolean constants ⊥ (falsehood) and > (truth) using the usual Boolean
connectives. A deductive theory is assumed, and this theory is specified in terms of a Tarskian consequence
operator: for any set S of formulas, Cn(S) is the set of logical consequences of S. It is assumed that Cn(−)
satisfies the following conditions:
• Inclusion: S ⊆ Cn(S),
• Monotony (also sometimes called “Monotonicity”): S ⊆ S′ implies Cn(S) ⊆ Cn(S′),
• Iteration: Cn(S) = Cn(Cn(S)), and
• Supraclassicality: Cn(S) contains each classical tautology in LCPL.
It is usually assumed that Cn(−) also satisfies the following conditions:
• Deductive Consistency: ⊥ /∈ Cn(∅); and
• Compactness: ϕ ∈ Cn(S) iff there exists a finite S′ ⊆ S such that ϕ ∈ Cn(S′).
The alternative notation S ` ϕ is used to express ϕ ∈ Cn(S). A belief base is a set of formulas in the
language, and a belief set is a deductively closed belief base (i.e., Cn(S) = S). Note that the phrase “belief
state” (a.k.a., “database”) is an intuitive notion meant to describe the agent’s situation with regard to her
beliefs. This intuitive notion is formalized either by a belief base (not necessarily deductively closed) or
a belief set (necessarily deductively closed). A belief base T ′ gives rise to a belief set T by applying the
consequence operator: T := Cn(T ′).
A revision operator is meant to take an existing belief set T and some incoming information ψ and
produce a new belief set T ∗ ψ that incorporates the incoming information ψ (i.e., ψ ∈ T ∗ ψ), is consistent
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Postulates of AGM Belief Revision
1. Closure: T ∗ ψ = Cn(T ∗ ψ)
2. Success: ψ ∈ T ∗ ψ
3. Inclusion: T ∗ ψ ⊆ T + ψ
4. Vacuity: if ¬ψ /∈ T , then T ∗ ψ = T + ψ
5. Consistency: if ¬ψ /∈ Cn(∅), then ⊥ /∈ Cn(T ∗ ψ)
6. Extensionality: if (ψ ↔ ψ′) ∈ Cn(∅), then T ∗ ψ = T ∗ ψ′
7. Superexpansion: T ∗ (ψ ∧ ϕ) ⊆ (T ∗ ψ) + ϕ
8. Subexpansion: if ¬ϕ /∈ Cn(T ∗ ψ), then (T ∗ ψ) + ϕ ⊆ T ∗ (ψ ∧ ϕ)
Notes: S + ψ := Cn(S ∪ {ψ});
Cn(−) satisfies Inclusion, Monotony, Iteration, and Supraclassicality;
Vacuity may be called “Preservation.”
Table 3. The AGM revision postulates (as presented in [7])
whenever the incoming information ψ is consistent (i.e., T ∗ ψ 0 ⊥ if ψ is consistent), and is obtained from
T by way of a “minimal change.” The latter is an intuitive (and non-formalized) guiding principle that is
used to persuade the reader that certain proposed postulates are desirable. From a formal perspective, it
can be safely ignored.
The AGM revision postulates are reproduced in Table 3. Postulates 1–6 are called the Ga¨rdenfors
postulates (or, more elaborately, the “basic Ga¨rdenfors postulates for revision”). Postulates 7–8 are called
the supplementary postulates.
Grove [6] proposed a possible worlds modeling of the AGM postulates. Modulo certain details we gloss
over, his proposal essentially amounts to this: represent the agent’s belief set using the minimal worlds of a
well-ordered plausibility model and define revision in terms of belief conditionalization.
Theorem 4.1 (AGM revision and Grove spheres; adapted from [6]). Let Cn(−) be the consequence function
CPL(−) of Classical Propositional Logic over the language LCPL. For each well-ordered plausibility model
M , each belief set T ⊆ LCPL, and each propositional formula ψ ∈ LCPL, define
M↓ := {ϕ ∈ LCPL | min(W ) ⊆ JϕKM} ,
T ∗M ψ := {ϕ ∈ LCPL | minJψKM ⊆ JϕKM} ,
BCPL := {L ⊆ LCPL | CPL(L) = L} .
Note that BCPL is the collection of all propositional belief sets. For a propositional formula or set of
propositional formulas X ∈ LCPL ∪ ℘(LCPL), to say X is consistent means ⊥ /∈ CPL(X) (or equivalently,
that CPL(X) 6= LCPL), and to say X is inconsistent means it is not consistent. To say that a plausibility
model M is a system of spheres means that M is well-ordered and the function
M↓ ∗M (−) : LCPL → BCPL
mapping propositional formulas ψ ∈ LCPL to belief sets M↓ ∗M ψ ∈ BCPL satisfies the AGM revision
postulates. To say that M is a Grove system for a belief set T ∈ BCPL means that M is a system of spheres
and M↓ = T .
(a) Each consistent belief set T ∈ BCPL has a Grove system.
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(b) Suppose for a function ∗ : BCPL ×LCPL → BCPL and each (T, ψ) ∈ BCPL ×LCPL we have:
(i) if T is inconsistent, then T ∗ ψ = M↓∗ ∗M∗ ψ for some fixed system of spheres M∗; and
(ii) if T is consistent, then T ∗ ψ = T ∗MT ψ for some fixed Grove system MT for T .
It follows that ∗ is an AGM revision operator.
Proof. See the appendix.
This suggests that we may view CDL as a version of AGM belief revision in which the revision process
itself can be described in the language [5, 4]. In particular, for propositional formulas ϕ and ψ, the formula
Bϕ, which is our abbreviation for B>ϕ, says that the agent believes ϕ before the revision takes place; and
the formula Bψϕ says that the agent believes ϕ after revision by ψ. So by restricting to propositional ϕ and
ψ, we can use conditional belief formulas Bψϕ to describe a version of the AGM revision process directly in
the language of LCDL. This leads us to the following overview of what the axiomatic theory CDL (Table 2)
has to say about the CDL-based version of AGM revision.
• (CL) and (MP) indicate that we use a classical meta-theory.
• The principles we have grouped together under the name “modal reasoning”—(CL), (MP), (K), and
(MN)—together correspond to AGM Closure and AGM Extensionality. In addition, it follows by
modal reasoning that our underlying “consequence operator” satisfies Inclusion, Monotony, Iteration,
and Supraclassicality.
• (Succ) corresponds to AGM Success.
• Under the assumption of (Succ), scheme (KM) corresponds to consequence of AGM Consistency:
inconsistency of revision by ψ implies inconsistency of ψ and therefore of ψ ∧ ϕ, and so inconsistency
of revision by ψ ∧ ϕ follows via (Succ).
• Under the assumption of (Succ), scheme (RM) corresponds to AGM Subexpansion. And if ϕ = >,
then (Succ) and (RM) together correspond to AGM Vacuity.
• (Inc) corresponds to AGM Subexpansion. And, if ϕ = >, then (Inc) corresponds to AGM Inclusion.
• (Comm) corresponds to a special case of AGM Extensionality (i.e., commutativity of conjunction).
• (PI) and (NI) do not corresponds to principles in the AGM setting (belief sets are subset of LCPL).
• (WCon) corresponds to AGM Consistency.
5 Justified Conditional Doxastic Logic
Though CDL may be viewed as a version of AGM revision in which Boolean combinations of revisions are
expressible in the language, one key aspect that is missing: the reasons as to why revisions result in a state
in which certain formulas are believed. This is a deficit present also in AGM revision: while a revision by ψ
may lead to a belief set that includes ϕ, it is not immediately clear why it is that ϕ ought to obtain. What is
missing is some language-describable reason that explains how it is ϕ came about as a result of the revision.
It shall be our task in this section to study how we might “fill in” these reasons in a theory based on CDL.
Our approach follows the general paradigm of Justification Logic [2], where modal operators are replaced by
syntactically structured objects called terms. Terms are meant to suggest “reasons” in the sense that the
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syntactic structure of a term accords with certain derivational principles in the underlying logic. Our goal
is to adapt this methodology to CDL. In particular, for a term t, we introduce new formulas
t :ψϕ
with the intended meaning that, whenever the agent revises her belief state by incorporating the formula ψ,
then t will be a reason justifying her belief of ϕ in the resulting belief state. Intuitively, the formula t :ψϕ
tells us two things. First, it tells us that the agent believes ϕ conditional on ψ, which was the information
conveyed in CDL by the formula Bψϕ. Second, something new: the formula t :ψϕ tells us that the reason
encoded by t supports ϕ. Taken together, t :ψϕ tells us that the agent has a reason-based belief of ϕ after
revising by ψ.
Terms will be built up using a simple grammar. At the base of this grammar are the “certificates,”
which are terms of the form cϕ for some formula ϕ. Intuitively, whenever we have one or more reasons in
support of ϕ, the certificate cϕ picks out the “best” one. So whenever ϕ has any support at all, we are
always guaranteed that cϕ names a particular reason in support of ϕ. As such, the theory we eventually
define will derive the principle
t :ψϕ→ cϕ :ψϕ ,
which says that the certificate cϕ supports ϕ after a revision by ψ whenever there is some reason t that
support ϕ after the same revision. In essence, certificates allow us to “forget” the details of a complex
argument in support of some assertion, remembering only that we at some point found such an argument.
Though a certificate cϕ must support the formula ϕ it certifies, as per the above-mentioned derivable
principle, we do not prevent cϕ from supporting other formulas as well. For example, it is consistent with
the theory we will develop for us to have cϕ :
ψχ for some χ 6= ϕ. As such, though we require certificates to
provide “best evidence” for the formulas they certify, we do not require that this be the only evidence that
they provide.
Other terms are formed from certificates using one of two operators. The first is the Application operator
“ · ” from Justification Logic. This operator is used to indicate that terms are to be combined using a single
step of the rule of Modus Ponens. In particular, the logic we will develop will derive the following principle:
t :ψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ (s :ψϕ1 → (t · s) :ψϕ2) .
This says that if t supports an implication after the revision by ψ and s supports the antecedent after the
same revision, then the combination t · s supports the consequence after that revision. This is the reason-
explicit version of the principle (K) of CDL. The difference is that the present version tells us something
about how we obtained the consequent: the form of t · s, with t to the left and s to the right, indicates that
t supports an implication and s supports the antecedent, and hence we were able to derive the consequent
via one step of Modus Ponens in virtue of the fact that we use a single instance of the Application operator
“ · ” to combine t with s to form t · s.
The second term-combining operator we introduce is the Sum operator “+” from Justification Logic.
This operator allows us to combine to reasons in a way that preserves support. In particular, the logic we
develop will derive the following principle:
(t :ψϕ ∨ s :ψϕ)→ (t+ s) :ψϕ .
This says that t+ s supports ϕ whenever at least one of t or s does so. As such, the sum t+ s combines the
supported statements of t and of s without performing logical inference.
Formulas of the language will be built up from the language of Classical Propositional Logic (based on
propositional letters, the constant ⊥ for falsehood, and material implication) by adding formulas of the form
t :ψϕ, where t is a term and ϕ and ψ are other formulas. Intuitively, t :ψϕ says that t supports the agent’s
belief of ϕ after she revises her beliefs by incorporating ψ.
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The theory we shall define is called Justified Conditional Doxastic Logic or JCDL. In addition to the
derivable principles mentioned above, JCDL has a number of additional principles that make explicit the
revision-based principles of CDL. In particular, we will see that every CDL-principle gives rise to a corre-
sponding JCDL-principle, and the other way around as well. We explain this in more detail after the main
definitions are in place.
5.1 Language and axiomatics
Definition 5.1 (LJCDL). LetP be a fixed set of propositional letters. The language of Justified Conditional
Doxastic Logic consists of the set LJCDL of formulas ϕ and set TJCDL of terms t formed by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | (ϕ→ ϕ) | t :ϕϕ p ∈P
t ::= cϕ | (t · t) | (t+ t)
Standard abbreviations for Boolean constants and connectives are used, and parentheses are dropped when
doing so will cause no confusion. We adopt the following key abbreviation:
B˙ψϕ denotes cϕ :
ψϕ .
We may write c(ϕ) as an abbreviation for cϕ when convenient. Also, we let t :ϕ abbreviate t :
∅ϕ, and we let
B˙ϕ abbreviate B˙∅ϕ.
Roughly speaking, it will be useful to think of B˙ψϕ as the JCDL-analog of the CDL-expression Bψϕ. We
will see that every CDL-principle gives rise to a JCDL-principle obtained by replacing modal operators “Bψ ”
by reason-based operators “ t :ψ ”. Accordingly, if Bψϕ is CDL-derivable, then a corresponding t :ψ
′
ϕ′ will
be derivable, where ψ′ corresponds to ψ and ϕ′ corresponds to ϕ). So using the certificate cϕ′ for ϕ′, it will
follow that B˙ψ
′
ϕ′ is derivable as well. It is in this sense that B˙ψ′ϕ′ may be thought of as the JCDL-analog
of the CDL-principle Bψϕ.
Definition 5.2 (JCDL theory). The theory JCDL is defined in Table 4.
(CL) and (MP) tell us that JCDL is an extension of Classical Propositional Logic.
(eK) is our reason-explicit analog of the CDL-scheme (K); it tells us that reason support is closed under
the rule of Modus Ponens using the Application operator “ · ”. (eSucc) is our reason-explicit analog of CDL
(Succ); it tells us that certificates are used to certify the success of belief revisions. (eKM) is our reason-
explicit version of (KM); it tells us that a reason supporting a contradiction conditional on some ψ continues
to do so no matter what additional information we conjunctively add to the conditional.
(eRM) is our reason-explicit version of (RM). The antecedent ¬B˙ψ¬ϕ is just lnotc¬ϕ :ψ¬ϕ. Since the
certificate c¬ϕ will always stand in for some argument relevant to ¬ϕ, the antecedent ¬B˙ψ¬ϕ tells us that
ϕ is consistent with the belief state obtained after revision by ψ. And (eRM) tells us that if this is so and
t is a reason to believe χ after revision by ψ, then it follows that t is still a reason to believe χ even after
we revise by the conjunction ψ ∧ ϕ. Notice that the reason t for χ does not change; it is only the revision
formula itself that changes.
(eInc) is our reason-explicit version of (Inc); it tells us that that a belief of ϕ → ψ is certified after
revising by ψ so long as there is a reason t for believing ψ after revising by ψ ∧ ϕ. (eComm) tells us that
reasons are invariant to the order of conjuncts in revisions; this is the reason-explicit analog of (Comm).
(ePI) and (eNI) are the reason-explicit versions of (PI) and (NI), respectively; these tell us that all support
and negated support statements are certified. (eWCon) is the reason-explicit analog of (WCon); it tells us
that if t is a reason supporting a belief in ⊥ after revision by ψ, then ¬ψ must have been true.
(eA) is particular to JCDL. This scheme tells us that if t supports a belief in ϕ conditional on ψ and
ϕ is also certified conditional on some other χ, then t must itself support ϕ conditional on χ as well. This
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Axiom Schemes
(CL) Schemes for Classical Propositional Logic
(eCert) t :ψϕ→ B˙ψϕ
(eK) t :ψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ (s :ψϕ1 → (t · s):ψϕ2)
(eSum) (t :ψϕ ∨ s :ψϕ)→ (t+ s) :ψϕ
(eSucc) B˙ψψ
(eKM) t :ψ⊥ → t :ψ∧ϕ⊥
(eRM) ¬B˙ψ¬ϕ→ (t :ψχ→ t :ψ∧ϕχ)
(eInc) t :ψ∧ϕχ→ B˙ψ(ϕ→ χ)
(eComm) t :ψ∧ϕχ→ t :ϕ∧ψχ
(ePI) t :ψχ→ B˙ϕ(t :ψχ)
(eNI) ¬t :ψχ→ B˙ϕ(¬t :ψχ)
(eWCon) t :ψ⊥ → ¬ψ
(eA) t :ψϕ→ (B˙χϕ→ t :χϕ)
Rules
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
(MP)
ψ
ϕ
(eMN)
B˙ψϕ
Note: B˙ψϕ abbreviates cϕ :
ψϕ.
Table 4. The theory JCDL
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tells us that if a reason supports a belief of ϕ after some revision, it does so no matter the particulars of
the revision. Said another way, reason support depends only on the statement supported (and not on the
revision).
(eMN) says that every derivable formula is “certified” (i.e., supported by its certificate). This corresponds
to the CDL-principle (MN). But while all derivable principles are certified, intuitively such certification omits
a great deal of information; in particular, it is not clear from which axioms a given principle follows and
how it is that it follows by way of the rules of the theory. Toward this end, it will be useful to consider a
restriction of (eMN) in which we apply this rule only to axioms, possibly multiple times in a row. An axiom
to which we apply (eMN) zero or more times in a row will be called a “possibly necessitated axiom.” We
will see that if we remove (eMN) from the theory, then all JCDL-theorems can be derived from the possibly
necessitated axioms using (MP) as the only rule. The trick to this will be to eliminate from JCDL-derivations
uses of (eMN) that are “troublesome necessitations”: these are the derivable consequences of (eMN) that
are not themselves possibly necessitated axioms. If we can show that all such “troublesome necessitations”
can be eliminated, then the result follows. This will be our task now.
The terms that can be formed from certificates of possibly necessitated axioms using the Application
operator “ · ” will be called the “logical terms.” These terms play a special role: every JCDL-theorem ϕ gives
rise to a logical term t that supports ϕ (i.e., t :ψϕ is derivable for each ψ).
Definition 5.3 (Necessitations, logical terms). A necessitation is a LJCDL-formula of the form
B˙ψnB˙ψn−1B˙ψn−2 · · · B˙ψ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
zero or more of these
ϕ (2)
for some integer n ≥ 0. A possibly necessitated axiom is a LJCDL-formula of the form (2) for which n ≥ 0
and ϕ is a JCDL-axiom. The set T LJCDL of logical terms is the smallest set that contains certificates cϕ for
each possibly necessitated axiom ϕ and is closed under the term-forming operation t, s 7→ t · s.
Definition 5.4 (Troublesome necessitations, notation pi `nJCDL ϕ). A JCDL-derivation is finite nonempty
sequence of LJCDL-formulas, each of which is either a JCDL-axiom or follows by a JCDL-rule from formulas
occurring earlier in the sequence. A line of a JCDL-derivation pi is an element of the sequence pi. A
troublesome necessitation is a line ϕ of a JCDL-derivation that neither is a possibly necessitated axiom nor
follows from earlier lines by (MP). Clearly, a troublesome necessitation must follow by applying (eMN) to
an earlier line that is not itself a possibly necessitated axiom. For n ∈ N, we write pi `nJCDL ϕ to mean that pi
is a JCDL-derivation that contains at most n troublesome necessitations and whose last line is ϕ. For n ∈ N,
we write `nJCDL ϕ to mean that there exists a JCDL-derivation pi such that pi `nJCDL ϕ. Obviously, `JCDL ϕ
implies `nJCDL ϕ for some n ∈ N.
The following lemma shows that every JCDL-theorem can be derived from the possibly necessitated
axioms using (MP) as the only rule of inference.
Lemma 5.5 (Elimination of troublesome necessitations). For each ϕ ∈ LJCDL, we have:
pi `nJCDL ϕ ⇒ ∃pi∗ ⊇ pi, pi∗ `0JCDL ϕ . (3)
Proof. See the appendix.
“Theorem Internalization” is a property of Justification Logics whereby every theorem ϕ of the logic
is witnessed by supporting term. Since certificates trivially support JCDL-theorems by (eMN), the usual
formulation of Theorem Internalization is trivialized in our setting. However, we can prove a stronger
variant: every JCDL-theorem ϕ is witnessed by a logical supporting term. This stronger version tells us that
all JCDL-theorems are witnessed by terms that refer only to possibly necessitated axioms and combinations
of these using rule (MP).
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Theorem 5.6 (JCDL Theorem Internalization). For each ψ ∈ LJCDL, we have:
`JCDL ϕ ⇒ ∃t ∈ T LJCDL, `JCDL t :ψϕ .
Proof. See the appendix.
5.2 Relationship to CDL
In our motivation of JCDL, we have described the formula t :ψϕ as an analog of a corresponding LCDL-
formula Bψϕ. Up to this point, the idea was mere intuition. We now make this intuition precise by defining
two mappings. The first, called “forgetful projection,” maps LJCDL-formulas to LCDL-formulas by replacing
each “ t :ψ ” prefix by the prefix “Bψ ”. The second, called “trivial realization,” maps LCDL-formulas to
LJCDL-formulas by replacing each prefix “B
ψ ” by the prefix “ B˙ψ ”. We will see that these operations
preserve derivability of schemes.
Definition 5.7 (The forgetful projection). The forgetful projection is the function
(−)◦ : LJCDL → LCDL
defined by:
q◦ := q for q ∈P ∪ {⊥}
(ϕ→ ψ)◦ := ϕ◦ → ψ◦
(t :ψϕ)◦ := Bψ
◦
ϕ◦
The forgetful projection of ψ ∈ LJCDL is the ψ◦ ∈ LCDL. Extend the function (−)◦ to sets Γ ⊆ LJCDL by
Γ◦ := {ϕ◦ | ϕ ∈ Γ}. We further extend the function (−)◦ to schemes. In particular, let S be a fixed set of
schematic variables (i.e., “metavariables” or placeholders for formulas) that includes all schematic variables
used in this paper and that has cardinality min{|P|, ω}. For each of our languages L ∈ {LCDL,LJCDL},
let L (S) be the set of formula schemes that can be formed using the formula formation grammar of L
but with schematic variables in S used in place of propositional letters in P. Define TJCDL(S) similarly.
Using Φ and Ψ as metavariables ranging over members of LJCDL(S) and T as a metavariable ranging over
members of TJCDL(S), let
X◦ := X for X ∈ S ∪ {⊥}
(Φ→ Ψ)◦ := Φ◦ → Ψ◦
(T :ΨΦ)◦ := BΨ
◦
Φ◦
Extend the function (−)◦ to sets Γ ⊆ LJCDL(S) by Γ◦ := {Φ◦ | Φ ∈ Γ}.
Definition 5.8 (Realizations and the trivial realization). A realization of a formula ϕ ∈ LCDL is a formula
ψ ∈ LJCDL for which ψ◦ = ϕ and `JCDL ψ. The trivial realization is the function (−)t : LCDL → LJCDL
defined by:
qt := q for q ∈P ∪ {⊥}
(ϕ→ ψ)t := ϕt → ψt
(Bψϕ)t := B˙ψ
t
ϕt
We extend the function (−)t to sets Γ ⊆ LCDL by Γt := {ϕt | ϕ ∈ Γ}. As in Definition 5.7 and using the
notation from that definition, we extend the function (−)t to schemes:
Xt := X for X ∈ S ∪ {⊥}
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(Φ→ Ψ)t := Φt → Ψt
(BΨΦ)t := B˙Ψ
t
Φt
Finally, we apply (−)t to sets Γ ⊆ LCDL(S) by defining Γt := {Φt | Φ ∈ Γ}. For some object Z in the domain
of (−)t we say that Zt is the trivial realization of Z.
The trivial realization of a formula or scheme of CDL is obtained by replacing each “B ” with “B˙ ”. Note
that while the word “realization” in the phrase “trivial realization” suggests that the trivial realization of
a formula or scheme is indeed a realization (i.e., we obtain something derivable in JCDL), this does not
come automatically (i.e., by definition) because the trivial realization is a mere syntactic translation and so
it must be proved that this translation satisfies the requisite property before the conclusion can be drawn.
However, the following theorem guarantees that the trivial realization is indeed a realization. The theorem
also tells us that the forgetful projection maps JCDL-theorems to CDL-theorems.
Theorem 5.9 (Projection and realization for schemes). We use the notation from Definitions 5.7 and 5.8.
For each Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LJCDL(S) and each ∆ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ LCDL(S), we have:
1. Γ `JCDL ϕ implies Γ◦ `CDL ϕ◦, and
2. ∆ `CDL ψ implies ∆t `JCDL ψt.
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorem 5.9 tells us that JCDL really is an explicit analog of CDL: every JCDL-derivable statement
gives rise to a CDL-derivable statement (by forgetful projection), and every CDL-derivable statement gives
rise to a JCDL-derivable statement (by trivial realization). This link makes precise our intuition that the
LCDL-formula B
ψϕ should correspond to the LJCDL-formula B˙
ψϕ.
Though Theorem 5.9 is stated with respect to schemes, we have the analogous result for formulas as well.
Theorem 5.10 (Projection and realization for formulas). We use the notation from Definitions 5.7 and 5.8.
For each Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LJCDL and each ∆ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ LCDL, we have:
1. Γ `JCDL ϕ implies Γ◦ `CDL ϕ◦, and
2. ∆ `CDL ψ implies ∆t `JCDL ψt.
Proof. Replace each distinct propositional letter with a distinct schematic variable, apply Theorem 5.9, and
take the instances of the resulting derivable schemes obtained by substituting the original propositional
variables back into their corresponding positions.
Using Theorem 5.9, the CDL-principles from Theorem 3.11 translate into JCDL-principles.
Theorem 5.11 (JCDL-theorems). The following schemes of (eCut), Explicit Cautious Monotonicity (eCM),
(eTaut), (eAnd), (eOr), Explicit Positive Reduction (ePR), and Explicit Negative Reduction (eNR) are all
derivable in JCDL:
(eCut) B˙ψϕ→ (B˙ψ∧ϕχ→ B˙ψχ)
(eCM) B˙ψϕ→ (B˙ψχ→ B˙ψ∧ϕχ)
(eTaut) B˙ϕ↔ B˙>ϕ
(eAnd) B˙ψϕ1 → (B˙ψϕ2 → B˙ψ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2))
(eOr) B˙ψ1ϕ→ (B˙ψ2ϕ→ B˙ψ1∨ψ2ϕ)
(ePR) B˙ϕB˙ψχ↔ (B˙ψ⊥ ∨ B˙ψχ)
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(eNR) B˙ϕ¬B˙ψχ↔ (B˙ϕ⊥ ∨ ¬B˙ψχ)
Also, the following rules of Explicit (Left) Logical Equivalence (eLE), Explicit Right Weakening (eRW), and
Explicit Supraclassicality (eSC) are all derivable in JCDL:
ψ ↔ ψ′
(eLE)
B˙ψχ↔ B˙ψ′χ
χ→ χ′
(eRW)
B˙ψχ→ B˙ψχ′
ψ → χ
(eSC)
B˙ψχ
Proof. Apply Theorems 3.11 and 5.9(2).
5.3 Semantics
One of the main possible worlds semantics for Justification Logic is the semantics due to Fitting (see [2] for
details). Here we adapt the traditional Fitting semantics for use in our language LJCDL.
Definition 5.12 (Fitting models). A Fitting model is a structure M = (W,≤, V, A) for which (W,≤, V ) is
a locally well-ordered plausibility model and A is an admissibility function: a function
A : (TJCDL ×LJCDL)→ ℘(W )
that maps each term-formula pair (t, ϕ) to a set A(t, ϕ) ⊆W of worlds subject to the following restrictions:
• Certification: A(cϕ, ϕ) = W ,
which says formulas are certified by their certificates;
• Application: A(t, ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∩A(s, ϕ1) ⊆ A(t · s, ϕ2),
which says the Application operator encodes instances of (MP);
• Sum: A(t, ϕ) ∪A(s, ϕ) ⊆ A(t+ s, ϕ),
which says the Sum operator encodes support aggregation without logical inference; and
• Admissibility Indefeasibility: if x ∈ A(t, ϕ) and y ∈ cc(x), then y ∈ A(t, ϕ),
which says admissibility is constant within each connected component. Using the notion of “knowledge”
from Remark 3.3, this tells us that the agent knows her admissibility function.
The notion of pointed Fitting model is similar to the corresponding definition found in Definition 2.2; we
also apply the terminology from that definition to Fitting models in the obvious way.
If A is an admissibility function, then w ∈ A(t, ϕ) says that, from the perspective of world w, term t has
the proper “syntactic shape” to be a reason in support of ϕ. This does not, however, guarantee that t does
indeed support ϕ. For this we shall require something more.
Definition 5.13 (LJCDL-truth). LetM = (W,≤, V, A) be a Fitting model. We extend the binary satisfaction
relation |= from Definition 3.2 to one between pointed Fitting models (M,w) (written without surrounding
parentheses) and LJCDL-formulas and we extend the function J−K from Definition 3.2 to include a functionJ−K : LJCDL → ℘(W ) as follows.
• JϕKM := {v ∈W |M,v |= ϕ}. The subscript M may be suppressed.
• M,w 6|= ⊥.
• M,w |= p iff p ∈ V (w) for p ∈P.
• M,w |= ϕ→ ψ iff M,w 6|= ϕ or M,w |= ψ.
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• M,w |= t :ψϕ iff w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and
∀x ∈ cc(w) : x↓ ∩ JψK = ∅ or ∃y ∈ x↓ ∩ JψK : y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK . (4)
So to have t :ψϕ true at a world w, we must have two things. First, from the perspective of w, term t
must have the correct “syntactic shape” for an argument in support of ϕ; that is, we must have w ∈ A(t, ϕ).
Second, we must satisfy the condition (4), which is the same condition we had for truth of a LCDL-formula
Bψϕ. So, taken together, to have t :ψϕ true at world w means that t has the “shape” of an argument for ϕ
and the agent believes ϕ after revising her beliefs by ψ. The following theorem states this precisely.
Theorem 5.14 (JCDL-truth in terms of belief formulas). Let M = (W,≤, V, A) be a Fitting model.
M,w |= t :ψϕ iff w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and M,w |= B˙ψϕ .
Proof. Left to right (“only if”): assume M,w |= t :ψϕ. By Definition 5.13, we have w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and (4). Since
we have w ∈ A(cϕ, ϕ) by the Certification property of admissibility functions and we have B˙ψϕ = cϕ :ψϕ by
definition, it follows from by (4) and w ∈ A(cϕ, ϕ) by Definition 5.13 that M,w |= B˙ψϕ.
Right to left (“if”): assume w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and M,w |= B˙ψϕ. Applying Definition 5.13 and the definition
B˙ψϕ = cϕ :
ψϕ, it follows that (4). So since we have w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and (4), it follows by Definition 5.13 that
M,w |= t :ψϕ.
In well-founded Fitting models, belief in ϕ conditional on ψ is equivalent to having ϕ true at the most
plausible ψ-worlds that are within the connected component of the actual world.
Theorem 5.15 (JCDL-truth in well-founded models). Let M = (W,≤, V, A) be a Fitting model.
(a) If M is well-founded: M,w |= t :ψϕ ⇔ w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK.
(b) If M is well-ordered: M,w |= t :ψϕ ⇔ w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and minJψK ⊆ JϕK.
Proof. (a), left to right (“only if”): assume M,w |= t :ψϕ. By Definition 5.13, we have w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and (4).
Use the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.4 to conclude that minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK. (a), right to left
(“if”): assume w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK. Use the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.4 to
conclude that (4). Applying Definition 5.13, it follows that M,w |= t :ψϕ.
(b): M is well-ordered, then cc(w) = W and M is well-founded. Apply (a).
And so in well-founded Fitting models, we can see that formulas B˙ψϕ really do play the semantic analog
of LCDL-belief formulas.
Theorem 5.16 (JCDL-truth in well-founded models in terms of belief formulas). Let M be a Fitting model.
(a) If M is well-founded: M,w |= B˙ψϕ ⇔ minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK.
(b) If M is well-ordered: M,w |= B˙ψϕ ⇔ minJψK ⊆ JϕK.
Proof. By the Certification (Definition 5.12) and Theorems 5.14 and 5.15.
Similar to LCDL, the intended semantic objects for LJCDL are the well-ordered models of the appropriate
type (in this case Fitting models, as opposed to simple plausibility models).
Definition 5.17 (LJCDL-validity). To say that a LJCDL-formula ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ, means that M |= ϕ
for each well-ordered Fitting model M . Though we use the same symbol “|=” for LJCDL-validity as we did
for LCDL-validity, it will be clear from context which notion is meant.
And as for CDL, locally well-ordered plausibility models would suffice.
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Theorem 5.18 (LJCDL-validity with respect to local well-orders). Let FL be the class of locally well-ordered
Fitting models. For each ϕ ∈ LJCDL, we have:
|= ϕ iff ∀M ∈ FL, M |= ϕ .
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Soundness and completeness of JCDL with respect to its intended semantics (i.e., well-ordered Fitting
models) makes use of many components of the proof of Theorem 3.13, itself essentially due to [5].
Theorem 5.19 (JCDL soundness and completeness). For each ϕ ∈ LJCDL:
`JCDL ϕ iff |= ϕ .
Proof. See the appendix.
6 Conclusion
We saw earlier that CDL is a version of AGM revision in which Boolean combinations of revisions are
expressible in the language. Since JCDL is a reason-explicit analog of CDL (as per Theorem 5.9), we are led
to the following suggestion: JCDL is a version of AGM revision in which Boolean combinations of reason-
explicit revisions are expressible in the language. In essence, a formula ϕ that is part of the belief state
after revision by ψ may be witnessed by a specific reason t whose syntactic structure tracks the genesis of
ϕ stepwise from basic principles. This suggests we think of JCDL as a theory of revisable justified belief. It
would be interesting to see if there is some explicit version of the AGM revision principles that matches up
with JCDL in the way that standard AGM matches up with CDL. However, we leave this issue for future
work.
A Technical results
A.1 Results for plausibility models
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Item 1 is obvious. Item 2 is a well-known result from order theory, but we reprove it
anyway for completeness purposes. So assume M is locally well-ordered and ∅ 6= S = cc(w) ⊆ W for some
w ∈W . Define
S′ := {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S : x ≤ y} .
We wish to prove that minS = S′. Proceeding, take x ∈ minS. If y ∈ S as well, then it follows from
x ∈ minS by the definition of minS that y 6< x, from which we obtain x ≤ y because S is a connected
component and ≤ is total on each connected component. Since y ∈ S was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
x ∈ S′. Hence minS ⊆ S′. To show the inclusion holds in the other direction, take x ∈ S′. If y ∈ S, then it
follows from x ∈ S′ by the definition of S′ that x ≤ y, from which we obtain y 6< x by the definition of 6<.
Since y ∈ S was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that x ∈ minS. Hence S′ ⊆ minS.
For Item 3, it follows from the fact that ≤ is well-ordered that W is a connected component. Further,
since ≤ is well-ordered, it is also locally well-ordered. The result therefore follows by Item 2.
For Item 4, let us first assume that M is well-founded. We wish to prove that each S ∈ ℘(W ) is smooth
in M . So take S ∈ ℘(W ). Since ∅ is smooth in M , let us assume further that S 6= ∅. Now take x ∈ S.
Since x ∈ x↓ ∩ S by the reflexivity of ≤, it follows that x↓ ∩ S 6= ∅. Therefore, since M is well-founded, it
follows that min(x↓ ∩ S) 6= ∅. That is, there exists y ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S). But then y ≤ x and x 6< y, from which
it follows that y ' x or y < x. And if y ' x, then it follows from y ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S) by the transitivity of ≤
that x ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S). So either we have x ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S) or we have y ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S) and y < x. Further,
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for each m ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S) and z ∈ S − (x↓ ∩ S), we have by the transitivity of ≤ that z 6< m. And for
each m ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S) and z ∈ (x↓ ∩ S), we have by the definition of min(x↓ ∩ S) that z 6< m. But then
m ∈ min(x↓ ∩ S) implies m ∈ minS. Taken together, we have shown that for each x ∈ S, either x ∈ minS
or there exists y ∈ minS such that y < x. It follows that S is smooth in M . Since we have shown that every
S ∈ ℘(W ) is smooth in M , it follows that M is smooth.
For the converse of Item 4, we assume that M is smooth. We wish to prove that M is well-founded.
So take a nonempty S ⊆ W . Since S is nonempty, we have x ∈ S. But M is smooth and so S is smooth
in M , and so it follows that x ∈ minS or there exists y ∈ minS such that y < x. In either case, we have
minS 6= ∅. So M is well-founded.
Items 5 and 6 follow from Item 4 by Definition 2.2.
A.2 Results for CDL
Proof of Theorem 3.4(a). Assume M is well-founded and M,w |= Bψϕ. The latter means
∀x ∈ cc(w) : x↓ ∩ JψK = ∅ or ∃y ∈ x↓ ∩ JψK : y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK . (5)
If minJψK ∩ cc(w) = ∅, then minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK. So let us assume further that minJψK ∩ cc(w) 6= ∅. Take
z ∈ minJψK∩ cc(w). Since we then have z ∈ z↓ ∩ JψK by the reflexivity of ≤ and the definition of minJψK, it
follows by (5) that
∃y ∈ z↓ ∩ JψK : y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK .
Now z ∈ cc(w) and y ∈ z↓ ∩ JψK, so it follows that y ∈ cc(w) and therefore that y ∈ JψK ∩ cc(w). From
this we obtain by z ∈ minJψK ∩ cc(w) that y 6< z. But y ∈ z↓, and therefore we have y ≤ z and z ≤ y.
As a result, z ∈ y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK. Since z ∈ minJψK ∩ cc(w) was chosen arbitrarily, we have proved that
minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK.
Conversely, assume M is well-founded and minJψK ∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK. To show that we have M,w |= Bψϕ,
we must show that (5) obtains. For this it suffices for us to take x ∈ cc(w) satisfying x↓ ∩ JψK 6= ∅ and prove
that
∃y ∈ x↓ ∩ JψK : y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK . (6)
Proceeding, since x↓ ∩ JψK 6= ∅ and M is well-founded, it follows that there exists y ∈ min(x↓ ∩ JψK). Since
minJψK∩ cc(w) ⊆ JϕK, if we can show that for every z ∈ y↓ ∩ JψK we have z ∈ minJψK∩ cc(w), then it would
follow that y↓ ∩ JψK ⊆ JϕK and therefore that (6), completing the argument. So take z ∈ y↓ ∩ JψK. It follows
by z ∈ y↓, y ∈ x↓, and x ∈ cc(w) that z ∈ cc(w). So to show that z ∈ minJψK ∩ cc(w), all that remains is to
prove that z ∈ minJψK, and for this it suffices to prove that u ∈ z↓∩ JψK implies u 6< z. So take u ∈ z↓∩ JψK.
Since u ∈ z↓, z ∈ y↓, and y ∈ x↓, we have
u ≤ z ≤ y ≤ x .
By the transitivity of ≤, it follows that u ≤ y and u ≤ x. Hence u ∈ x↓ ∩ JψK. Since y ∈ min(x↓ ∩ JψK),
it follows that u 6< y. But from u 6< y and u ≤ y, it follows by the definition of 6< that y ≤ u. And from
z ≤ y ≤ u, it follows by the transitivity of ≤ that z ≤ u. Applying the definition of 6<, we obtain u 6< z.
Proof of Theorem 3.11. We reason in CDL. For (Cut), assume Bψϕ and Bψ∧ϕχ. It follows from Bψ∧ϕχ by
(Inc) that Bψ(ϕ→ χ). But from Bψ(ϕ→ χ) and Bψϕ we obtain by (MR) that Bψχ.
For (CM), we reason by cases under the assumption Bψϕ. First: if ¬Bψ¬ϕ, then we obtain Bψχ →
Bψ∧ϕχ by (RM) and (CR). Second: if Bψ¬ϕ, then it follows by our assumption Bψϕ and (MR) that Bψ⊥;
applying (KM) and (CR) yields Bψ∧ϕ⊥, from which we obtain Bψ∧ϕχ by (MR).
(Taut) obtains by (CR) since Bϕ = B>ϕ. (And) obtains by (MR).
For (Or), we assume Bψ1ϕ and Bψ2ϕ. Take i ∈ {1, 2}. By (Succ) and (MR) we obtain Bψi(ψ1 ∨ ψ2).
From Bψi(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) and our assumption Bψiϕ, we obtain by (CM) and (Comm) that B(ψ1∨ψ2)∧ψiϕ. From
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this it follows by (Inc) that Bψ1∨ψ2(ψi → ϕ). Since we have this for each i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows by (MR) that
Bψ1∨ψ2((ψ1 ∨ ψ2)→ ϕ). Since Bψ1∨ψ2(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) by (Succ), we obtain the result Bψ1∨ψ2ϕ by (MR).
For (PR), we have the following:
1. Bϕ¬Bψχ→ (BϕBψχ→ Bϕ⊥) (MR)
2. (BϕBψχ ∧ ¬Bϕ⊥)→ ¬Bϕ¬Bψχ (CR), 1
3. ¬Bψχ→ Bϕ¬Bψχ (NI)
4. ¬Bϕ¬Bψχ→ Bψχ (CR), 3
5. (BϕBψχ ∧ ¬Bϕ⊥)→ Bψχ (CR), 2, 4
6. BϕBψχ→ (Bϕ⊥ ∨Bψχ) (CR), 5
7. Bψχ→ BϕBψχ (PI)
8. Bϕ⊥ → BϕBψχ (MR)
9. (Bϕ⊥ ∨Bψχ)→ BϕBψχ (CR), 7, 8
10. BϕBψχ↔ (Bϕ⊥ ∨Bψχ) (CR), 6, 9
To obtain the proof for (NR), replace each occurrence of Bψχ in the above proof with ¬Bψχ and change
the reason for line 7 from (PI) to (NI). It is straightforward to verify that this operation yields a derivation
of (NR).
For (LE), assume ψ ↔ ψ′. We have Bψψ by (Succ). Applying (MR) to our assumption, we obtain
Bψ(ψ → ψ′). Hence Bψψ′ by (MR). By similar reasoning, we obtain Bψ′ψ. Now by (CM), Bψψ′, (Comm),
and (CR), we obtain Bψχ→ Bψ′∧ψχ. By Bψ′ψ, (Cut), and (CR), we obtain Bψ′∧ψχ→ Bψ′χ. But then it
follows by (CR) that Bψχ → Bψ′χ. A similar argument shows that Bψ′χ → Bψχ. By (CR), we conclude
that Bψχ↔ Bψ′χ.
(RW) follows by (MR). For (SC), from ψ → ϕ we obtain Bψ(ψ → ϕ) by (MN); however, we have Bψψ
by (Succ), and so it follows by (MR) that Bψϕ.
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Left to right: it suffices to show that CDL derives (IEa), (IEb), and (LE).
• (IEa): `CDL Bψϕ→ (Bψ∧ϕχ↔ Bψχ).
By (CM), (Cut), and (CR).
• (IEb): `CDL ¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψ∧ϕχ↔ Bψ(ϕ→ χ)).
Reasoning in CDL, by (Inc) and (CR) we have
¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψ(ϕ→ χ)) ,
and so it suffices by (CR) to prove that
¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψ(ϕ→ χ)→ Bψ∧ϕχ) . (7)
Proceeding, we have
¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψ(ϕ→ χ)→ Bψ∧ϕ(ϕ→ χ)) (8)
by (RM). We also have Bψ∧ϕ(ψ∧ϕ) by (Succ) and therefore Bψ∧ϕϕ by (MR). But then we obtain (7)
from (8) and Bψ∧ϕϕ by (MR). The result follows.
• (LE): if `CDL ψ ↔ ψ′, then `CDL Bψχ↔ Bψ′χ.
By Theorem 3.11.
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This completes the left-to-right direction. Right to left: it suffices to show that CDL0 derives (KM), (RM),
(Inc), and (Comm).
• (KM): `CDL0 Bψ⊥ → Bψ∧ϕ⊥.
We reason in CDL0. We have B
ψ⊥ → (Bψϕ ∧ Bψ⊥) by (MR). Applying (IEa) and (CR), we obtain
Bϕ⊥ → Bψ∧ϕ⊥.
• (RM): `CDL0 ¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψχ→ Bψ∧ϕχ).
Reasoning in CDL0, we assume ¬Bψ¬ϕ and Bψχ. It follows from Bψχ by (MR) that Bψ(ϕ → χ).
From this and our assumption ¬Bψ¬ϕ, we obtain Bψ∧ϕχ by (IEb) and (CR).
• (Inc): `CDL0 Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψ(ϕ→ χ).
We reason in CDL0 by cases. First: if ¬Bψ¬ϕ, then we obtain Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψ(ϕ→ χ) by (IEb). Second:
if Bψ¬ϕ, then we obtain Bψ(ϕ→ χ) by (MR) and therefore Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψ(ϕ→ χ) by (CR).
• (Comm): `CDL0 Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bϕ∧ψχ.
By (LE) and (CR).
Proof of Theorem 3.13. We use the notation and concepts from Remark 3.8. Let
LCDLa := L
{a}
CDL and CDLa := CDL
{a}
0 .
We write χa for the LCDLa-formula obtained from the LCDL0-formula χ by recursively replacing each occur-
rence of a modal operator Bθ in χ by Bθa. Obviously, (χ
a)′ = χ and (θ′)a = θ.
It was shown by Board [5] that we have `CDLa χ iff |={a}CDLa χ. By Remark 3.8, this is equivalent to the
statement that
∀χ ∈ LCDLa : `CDLa χ iff |= χ′ . (9)
By induction on derivation length, it is easy to see that the operation χ 7→ χa maps CDL0-theorems to
CDLa-theorems and the operation χ 7→ χ′ maps CDLa-theorems to CDL0-theorems. So `CDL0 ϕ iff `CDL0 ϕa.
Applying (9) and the fact that (ϕa)′ = ϕ, we obtain `CDL0 ϕ iff |= ϕ. Applying Theorem 3.12, we obtain
`CDL ϕ iff |= ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 3.13. The argument can be obtained by combining the ideas from the various proofs in
[5]. However, this requires restricting to the single-agent case and combining multiple arguments, so it is
not so transparent how the argument should go. In the interest of making the argument clear and so that
we have some constructions available for us later when we turn to the JCDL case, we provide a full proof
here. However, the argument is truly due to [5].
For soundness, we proceed by induction on the length of derivation. In the induction base, we must show
that each axiom scheme is wf-valid. (CL) is straightforward, so we proceed with the remaining schemes. Let
M be an arbitrary well-founded plausibility model. We make tacit use of Theorem 3.4.
• (K) is valid: |= Bψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ (Bψϕ1 → Bψϕ2).
Assume (M,w) satisfies Bψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2) and Bψϕ1. Then minJψK ⊆ Jϕ1 → ϕ2K and minJψK ⊆ Jϕ1K.
Hence minJψK ⊆ Jϕ2K. So (M,w) satisfies Bψϕ2.
• (Succ) is valid: |= Bψψ.
We have minJψK ⊆ JψK by the definition of minJψK. So (M,w) satisfies Bψψ.
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• (KM) is valid: |= Bψ⊥ → Bψ∧ϕ⊥.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies Bψ⊥. Then minJψK ⊆ J⊥K = ∅. Since M is well-founded, it follows thatJψK = ∅. But then Jψ ∧ ϕK = ∅, from which it follows that minJψ ∧ ϕK = ∅ ⊆ J⊥K. So (M,w) satisfies
Bψ∧ϕ⊥.
• (RM) is valid: |= ¬Bψ¬ϕ→ (Bψχ→ Bψ∧ϕχ).
Suppose (M,w) satisfies ¬Bψ¬ϕ and Bψχ. It follows that minJψK * J¬ϕK and minJψK ⊆ JχK. Hence
minJψK ∩ JϕK 6= ∅. We prove that minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ minJψK ∩ JϕK. Proceeding, take x ∈ minJψ ∧ ϕK.
Since minJψK ∩ JϕK 6= ∅, there exists y ∈ minJψK ∩ JϕK. Hence y ∈ Jψ ∧ ϕK. Since x ∈ minJψ ∧ ϕK and
≤ is total, we have x ≤ y. But x ∈ JψK and y ∈ minJψK, and therefore it follows from x ≤ y that
x ∈ minJψK as well. Since x ∈ JϕK, we have x ∈ minJψK∩JϕK. Conclusion: minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ minJψK∩JϕK.
So since minJψK ⊆ JχK, it follows that
minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ minJψK ∩ JϕK ⊆ JχK ∩ JϕK ⊆ JχK .
That is, minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK. So (M,w) satisfies Bψ∧ϕχ.
• (Inc) is valid: |= Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bψ(ϕ→ χ).
Suppose (M,w) satisfies Bψ∧ϕχ. Then minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK. We prove that minJψK ⊆ Jϕ→ χK. Pro-
ceeding, take x ∈ minJψK. If x /∈ JϕK, then x ∈ Jϕ→ χK. So let us assume further that x ∈ JϕK and
therefore that x ∈ Jψ ∧ ϕK. Now take any y ∈ Jψ ∧ ϕK. Since y ∈ JψK, if we had y < x, then it would
follow that x /∈ minJψK, contradicting our choice of x. Hence y ∈ Jψ ∧ ϕK implies y 6< x, from which it
follows by x ∈ Jψ ∧ ϕK that x ∈ minJψ ∧ ϕK. But we have minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK and hence x ∈ JχK, from
which we obtain x ∈ Jϕ→ χK. Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies Bψ(ϕ→ χ).
• (Comm) is valid: |= Bψ∧ϕχ→ Bϕ∧ψχ.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies Bψ∧ϕχ. Then minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK. Since Jψ ∧ ϕK = Jϕ ∧ ψK, it follows that
minJϕ ∧ ψK ⊆ JχK. But then (M,w) satisfies Bϕ∧ψχ.
• (PI) is valid: |= Bψχ→ BϕBψχ.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies Bψχ. Hence minJψK ⊆ JχK, which implies that (M,v) satisfies Bψχ for any
given v ∈ cc(w) = W . That is, JBψχK = W . Therefore, minJϕK ⊆ JBψχK. Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies
BϕBψχ.
• (NI) is valid: |= ¬Bψχ→ Bϕ¬Bψχ.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies ¬Bψχ. Then minJψK * JχK. It follows that M,v |= ¬Bψχ for each v ∈
cc(w) = W . Therefore, J¬BψχK = W , from which it follows that minJϕK ⊆ J¬BψχK. Conclusion:
(M,w) satisfies Bϕ¬Bψχ.
• (WCon) is valid: |= Bψ⊥ → ¬ψ.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies Bψ⊥. It follows that minJψK ⊆ J⊥K = ∅. Since ≤ is well-founded, it follows
that JψK = ∅. But this implies J¬ψK = W . So (M,w) satisfies ¬ψ.
This completes the induction base. For the induction step, we must show that validity is preserved under
the rules of (MP) and (MN). The argument for (MP) is standard, so let us focus on (MN). We assume |= ϕ
for the CDL-derivable ϕ (this is the “induction hypothesis”), and we prove that |= Bψϕ. Proceeding, since
we have |= ϕ by the induction hypothesis, it follows that JϕK = W and hence that minJψK ⊆ JϕK. But then
(M,w) satisfies Bψϕ. Soundness has been proved.
Since CDL is sound with respect to the class of well-ordered plausibility models we note that CDL is
consistent (i.e., 0CDL ⊥). In particular, take any pointed plausibility model (M,w) containing only the
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single world w. Since there is only one world, M is well-ordered. Further, by soundness, we have that
`CDL ϕ to M,w |= ϕ. Therefore, since M,w 6|= ⊥ by Definition 3.2, it follows that 0CDL ⊥. That is, CDL is
consistent. We make use of this fact tacitly in what follows.
For completeness, we write ` without any subscript in the remainder of this proof as an abbreviation
for `CDL. Take θ such that 0 ¬θ. We shall prove that θ is satisfiable at a locally well-ordered pointed
plausibility model and then apply Theorem 3.6 to draw the desired conclusion. Our construction is based on
the completeness constructions given in [5]. Proceeding, provability will always be taken with respect to CDL,
the language is assumed to be LCDL, and we make tacit use of Theorem 3.11. To say that a set of formulas
is consistent means that for no finite subset does the conjunction provably imply ⊥. For sets S and S′ of
formulas, to say that S is maximal consistent in (or “maxcons in”) S′ means that S ⊆ S′, S is consistent,
and extending S by adding any formula in S′ not already present would yield a set that is inconsistent (i.e.,
not consistent). Given a formula ϕ, we write sub(ϕ) to denote the set of sub-formulas of ϕ, including ϕ
itself. We extend this definition to sets of formulas: for a set S of formulas, sub(S) :=
⋃
ϕ∈S sub(ϕ). Given
a set S of formulas, we write ⊕S to denote the Boolean closure of S (with respect to the language): this
is the smallest extension of S that contains all Boolean constants that are primitive to the language (i.e.,
⊥) and is closed under all Boolean operations that are primitive to the language (i.e., implication). Since
our language is Boolean complete (i.e., every Boolean constant and every Boolean connective is definable
in terms of the Boolean constants and Boolean connectives primitive to the language), it follows that the
Boolean closure ⊕S of S is the smallest extension of S that contains all definable Boolean constants (i.e.,
⊥ and >) and is closed under all definable Boolean connectives (e.g., implication, conjunction, disjunction,
and negation). For a set S of formulas, we define:
±S := S ∪ {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ S} ,
B0S := S ,
Bi+1S := ±{Bψϕ | ψ ∈ S and ϕ ∈ BiS} ,
BωS :=
⋃
0<i<ω BiS ,
C0 := ± sub({θ,⊥,>}) ,
C1 := ⊕C0 ,
B := BωC1 ,
C := C1 ∪B .
Notice that 0 is excluded in the definition of BωS. Further, C0 is finite. Since 0 ¬θ, we may extend {¬θ} to
a set wθ that is maxcons in C. We then define:
W := {x ⊆ C | x is maxcons in C} ,
x¯ :=
∧
(x ∩ C0) for x ∈W ,
xψ := {ϕ | Bψϕ ∈ x} for x ∈W and ψ ∈ C1 ,
≤ := {(x, y) ∈W ×W | ∃ψ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1), yψ ⊆ x} ,
V (x) :=P ∩ x for x ∈W ,
M := (W,≤, V ) .
Notice that for x ∈W , we have x¯ ∈ C1, from which it follows by the maximal consistency of x in C ⊇ C1
that x¯ ∈ x. Further, it follows by the definition x¯ = ∧(x ∩C0) and the fact that x is maximal consistent in
C = C1 ∪B that for each ψ ∈ C1 = ⊕C0, we have ` x¯→ ψ or ` x¯→ ¬ψ. Finally, if x ≤ y and x 6= y, then
it follows by the maximal consistency of x and of y in C that x¯ /∈ y and y¯ /∈ x and therefore that ` x¯→ ¬y¯
and ` y¯ → ¬x¯. We make tacit use of the facts mentioned in this paragraph in what follows.
We prove that W is finite. First a definition due to [8]: to say a set S of formulas is logically finite means
that S has a finite basis, which is a finite S′ ⊆ S satisfying the property that for every χ ∈ S, there exists
25
χ′ ∈ S′ such that ` χ ↔ χ′. It can be shown by a normal form argument that if S is logically finite, then
there can be only finitely many sets that are maximal consistent in S. So to prove that W is finite, it suffices
to prove that C is logically finite. Proceeding, since C1 was obtained as the Boolean closure of the finite set
C0, it follows by a normal form argument that C1 has a finite basis C
′
1. So for B
ψϕ ∈ B1C1, since we have
that ψ ∈ C1 and ϕ ∈ B0C1 = C1, there exists ψ′ ∈ C ′1 and ϕ′ ∈ C ′1 such that
` ψ ↔ ψ′ and ` ϕ↔ ϕ′ .
Applying (LE) and modal reasoning, it follows that
` Bψϕ↔ Bψ′ϕ′ .
Since Bψ
′
ϕ′ ∈ B1C ′1 and ¬Bψ
′
ϕ′ ∈ B1C ′1, it follows by classical reasoning that B1C ′1 is a finite basis for
B1C1. Therefore, there exists a finite basis B
′
1 for ⊕B1C ′1. We prove by induction on positive i < ω that the
set B′1 is also a finite basis for BiC1. The induction base case i = 1 (for B1C1) has already been handled.
So let us proceed with the induction step: we assume B′1 is a finite basis for BjC1 for each non-negative
integer j that does not exceed some fixed i ≥ 1 (this is the “induction hypothesis”), and we prove that B′1 is
a finite basis for Bi+1C1. Proceeding, take χ ∈ Bi+1C1. Since i ≥ 1, we have i+ 1 ≥ 2 and therefore χ has
one of the forms BψBδϕ, Bψ¬Bδϕ, ¬BψBδϕ, or Bψ¬Bδϕ for some ϕ ∈ Bi−1C1. We have by (PR), (NR),
and classical reasoning that the following “reductive equivalences” obtain:
` BψBδϕ↔ (Bψ⊥ ∨Bδϕ) ,
` ¬BψBδϕ↔ (¬Bψ⊥ ∧ ¬Bδϕ) ,
` Bψ¬Bδϕ↔ (Bψ⊥ ∨ ¬Bδϕ) ,
` ¬Bψ¬Bδϕ↔ (¬Bψ⊥ ∧Bδϕ) .
Bψ⊥ and ¬Bψ⊥ are members of B1C1, and Bδϕ and ¬Bδϕ are members of BiC1. Since i + 1 > 1 and
i + 1 > i, we may apply the induction hypothesis: there exist members (Bψ⊥)′, (¬Bψ⊥)′, (Bδϕ)′, and
(¬Bδϕ)′ of B′1 such that the following “inductive equivalences” obtain:
` Bψ⊥ ↔ (Bψ⊥)′ , ` ¬Bψ⊥ ↔ (¬Bψ⊥)′ ,
` Bδϕ↔ (Bδϕ)′ , ` ¬Bδϕ↔ (¬Bδϕ)′ .
Let us call the four formulas appearing on the right sides of the inductive equivalences the “reduced formulas.”
Each reduced formula is a member of the finite basis B′1 for ⊕B1C1, and therefore each reduced formula is
also a member of ⊕B1C1. Since ⊕B1C1 is closed under all definable Boolean operations and B′1 is a finite
basis for ⊕B1C1, it follows that any Boolean combination of the reduced formulas is also a member of ⊕B1C1
and therefore that any such Boolean combination is provably equivalent to a formula in B′1. But then it
follows by the inductive equivalences and classical reasoning that the right side of each reductive equivalence
is provably equivalent to a Boolean combination of reduced formulas, and the latter combination is itself
provably equivalent to a formula in B′1. It follows that our original formula χ ∈ Bi+1C must be provably
equivalent to a formula in B′1 as well. Therefore, B′1 is indeed a finite basis for Bi+1C1. This completes
the induction step. We conclude that B′1 is a finite basis for BiC1 for each i ≥ 1. As a result, it follows
that B′1 is a finite basis for B = BωC1 =
⋃
0<i<ω BiC1. But then C
′
1 ∪ B′1 is a finite basis for C = C1 ∪ B.
Conclusion: W is finite.
Suppose we are given x ∈ W and ϕ ∈ x. If ` ϕ → ψ and ψ ∈ C, then it follows by the maximal
consistency of x in C that ψ ∈ C. It is tedious to repeatedly verify membership assertions in C and state
that the reason the result follows is by the fact that x is maximal consistent in C. Therefore, we adopt the
convention that we shall generally only write that ` ϕ→ ψ and ϕ ∈ x together imply ψ ∈ x. In so doing, we
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tacitly indicate (and the reader should verify) that ψ ∈ C, x is maximal consistent in C, and so the result
follows by the maximal consistency of x in C. The reader will always know when such tacit use takes place
(and requires verification), since this use occurs every time it is stated that a membership assertion ψ ∈ x
obtains as a logical consequence of some collection of assumptions that does not include the assumption
ψ ∈ x itself. Finally, for convenience in the remainder of the proof, we shall say that a set is “maximal
consistent” to mean that it is maximal consistent in C.
Agreement Lemma: for each {x, y} ⊆ W , if ψ ∈ C1 and xψ ⊆ y, then x ∩ B = y ∩ B. We prove this
now. Proceeding, assume ψ ∈ C1 and xψ ⊆ y. If Bχϕ ∈ x, then BψBχϕ ∈ x by (PI) and therefore Bχϕ ∈ y
by xψ ⊆ y. So Bχϕ ∈ x implies Bχϕ ∈ y. Now suppose Bχϕ ∈ y. If we had Bχϕ /∈ x, it would follow
by maximal consistency that ¬Bχϕ ∈ x, hence Bψ¬Bχϕ ∈ x by (NI), and hence ¬Bχϕ ∈ y, contradicting
the consistency of y because Bχϕ ∈ y. So Bχϕ ∈ y implies Bχϕ ∈ x. Conclusion: the Agreement Lemma
obtains. Note that we obtain from this lemma by the definition of ≤ that that x ≤ y implies x∩B = y ∩B.
We prove that ≤ is reflexive. By the definition of ≤, it suffices to prove that xx¯ ⊆ x. Proceeding, since
Bx¯ϕ ∈ x implies Bx¯ϕ ∈ B = ⋃0<i<ω BiC1, all we need do is prove by induction on i ≥ 1 that Bx¯ϕ ∈ x∩BiC1
implies ϕ ∈ x.
• Induction base: Bx¯ϕ ∈ x ∩B1C1.
We have ϕ ∈ C1 and hence ` x¯ → ϕ or ` x¯ → ¬ϕ. If ` x¯ → ¬ϕ, then it follows by (SC) that
Bx¯¬ϕ ∈ x. Since we also have Bx¯ϕ ∈ x, we obtain by modal reasoning that Bx¯⊥ ∈ x, from which it
follows by (WCon) that ¬x¯ ∈ x, a contradiction. Therefore it follows that ` x¯→ ϕ and hence ϕ ∈ x.
• Induction step: we assume the result for i = 1, . . . , k and we prove the result for i = k + 1.
Assume Bx¯ϕ ∈ x∩Bk+1C1. Since k ≥ 2, it follows that ϕ = Bψχ or ϕ = ¬Bψχ. Therefore, by (PR) or
(NR) we have Bx¯⊥∨ϕ ∈ x. As in the induction base, it follows by (WCon) that Bx¯⊥ /∈ x. Therefore,
ϕ ∈ x.
Conclusion: ≤ is reflexive.
We prove that ≤ is transitive. Proceeding, assume x ≤ y ≤ z. This means there exists a ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1)
and b ∈ (y ∩ z ∩ C1) such that ya ⊆ x and zb ⊆ x. It follows that a ∨ b ∈ (x ∩ z ∩ C1), and so to conclude
x ≤ z, it suffices for us to prove that za∨b ⊆ x. Proceeding, we take an arbitrary Ba∨bϕ ∈ x and we seek to
prove that ϕ ∈ z. We consider two cases.
• Case: Ba∨b¬a ∈ z.
Since Ba∨b(a ∨ b) ∈ z by (Succ), it follows by the assumption of this case and modal reasoning that
Ba∨bb ∈ z. Applying the latter and the assumption of the case again, we obtain by (CM) that
B(a∨b)∧b¬a ∈ z, from which it follows by (LE) that Bb¬a ∈ z. But zb ⊆ y and therefore ¬a ∈ y. Since
a ∈ y, we have reached a contradiction. So this case cannot obtain, and so there is nothing more to
prove.
• Case: ¬Ba∨b¬a ∈ z.
From the assumption of this case and Ba∨bϕ ∈ z we obtain by (RM) that B(a∨b)∧aϕ ∈ z. Applying
(LE), it follows that Baϕ ∈ z. Hence BbBaϕ ∈ z by (PI). Since zb ⊆ y, it follows that Baϕ ∈ y. Since
ya ⊆ x, we obtain ϕ ∈ x.
Conclusion: ≤ is transitive.
We prove that ≤ is total on each connected component. Proceeding, suppose we have w ∈ W and
(x, y) ∈ cc(w) × cc(w). Since x ∈ cc(w) and y ∈ cc(w), it follows that v ≤ w or w ≤ v for each v ∈ {x, y}.
Applying the definition of ≤ and the Agreement Lemma, we obtain x ∩ B = y ∩ B. We wish to prove that
x ≤ y or y ≤ x. We consider two cases.
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• Case: Bx¯∨y¯¬x¯ ∈ x ∩ y.
By (Succ), we have Bx¯∨y¯(x¯ ∨ y¯) ∈ x ∩ y. Applying the assumption of this case and modal reasoning,
we obtain Bx¯∨y¯y¯ ∈ x ∩ y. We shall now prove that y ≤ x. Proceeding, take an arbitrary Bx¯∨yϕ ∈ x.
It follows from this by Bx¯∨y¯y¯ ∈ x and (CM) that B(x¯∨y¯)∧y¯ϕ ∈ x. Applying (LE), we obtain By¯ϕ ∈ x.
Since x ∩ B = y ∩ B, we have By¯ϕ ∈ y. But we saw in the argument for reflexivity that yy¯ ⊆ y and
therefore ϕ ∈ y. So we have proved that for an arbitrary By¯ϕ ∈ y, we obtain ϕ ∈ y. That is, we have
shown that xx¯∨y¯ ⊆ y. Since x¯ ∨ y¯ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1), it follows that y ≤ x.
• Case: ¬Bx¯∨y¯¬x¯ ∈ x ∩ y.
We prove that x ≤ y. Proceeding, take an arbitrary Bx¯∨y¯ϕ ∈ y. It follows from this by the assumption
of this case and (RM) that B(x¯∨y¯)∧x¯ϕ ∈ y. Applying (LE), Bx¯ϕ ∈ y. Since y ∩B = x ∩B, we obtain
Bx¯ϕ ∈ x. But we saw in the argument for reflexivity that xx¯ ⊆ x and therefore ϕ ∈ x. So we have
proved that for an arbitrary Bx¯∨y¯ϕ ∈ y, we obtain ϕ ∈ x. That is, yx¯∨y¯ ⊆ x. Since x¯∨ y¯ ∈ (x∩y∩C1),
it follows that x ≤ y.
Conclusion: ≤ is total on each connected component.
Since wθ ∈ W , it follows that W is nonempty. Therefore, ≤ is a reflexive and transitive binary relation
over the nonempty finite set W , and ≤ is total on each connected component. It follows from the finiteness
of W that ≤ is well-founded. Therefore, M is a locally well-ordered plausibility model. We now prove a few
lemmas that will be of assistance.
Consistency Lemma: for each x ∈ W , if ψ ∈ x, then xψ is consistent. We prove this now. Proceeding,
suppose xψ is not consistent. It follows that there exists a nonempty {χ1, . . . , χn} ⊆ xψ such that `
(
∧
i≤n χi) → ⊥. By modal reasoning, ` (
∧
i≤nB
ψχi) → Bψ⊥. Since χi ∈ xψ and hence Bψχi ∈ x for each
i ≤ n, it follows that Bψ⊥ ∈ x. Applying (WCon), ¬ψ ∈ x, which contradicts the consistency of x because
we assumed ψ ∈ x. Conclusion: xψ is consistent.
Minimality Lemma: for each ψ ∈ C1 and x ∈ [ψ], where
[ψ] := {x ∈W | ψ ∈ x} ,
we have x ∈ min[ψ] iff ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x.
• Left to right: for ψ ∈ C1 and x ∈ [ψ], we prove x ∈ min[ψ] implies ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x.
Assume ψ ∈ C1 and x ∈ min[ψ]. Toward a contradiction, suppose Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x. Applying the Con-
sistency Lemma, xψ is consistent and so may be extended to a maximal consistent y ∈ W . Since
Bψψ ∈ x by (Succ), it follows that ψ ∈ y. And since Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x, it follows that ¬x¯ ∈ y and therefore
that y 6= x. But then ψ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1) and yψ ⊆ x, from which it follows that y ≤ x. Since y ∈ [ψ],
y ≤ x, and x ∈ min[ψ], it follows that x ≤ y. That is, there exists δ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1) such that yδ ⊆ x.
Now if we had Bψ¬δ ∈ x, then it would follow that ¬δ ∈ y, contradicting the fact that δ ∈ y. Hence
¬Bψ¬δ ∈ x. Since Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x as well, it follows by (RM) and (Comm) that Bδ∧ψ¬x¯ ∈ x. Applying
(Inc), Bδ(ψ → ¬x¯) ∈ x. Since x ≤ y implies x ∩ B = y ∩ B, it follows that Bδ(ψ → ¬x¯) ∈ y, from
which it follows by yδ ⊆ x that ψ → ¬x¯ ∈ x. Since ψ ∈ x, we obtain ¬x¯ ∈ x, a contradiction. Our
assumption Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x must have been incorrect, and so we must have ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x after all.
• Right to left: for ψ ∈ C1 and x ∈ [ψ], we prove ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x implies x ∈ min[ψ].
Assume ψ ∈ C1, x ∈ [ψ] and, ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x. It suffices to show that for each y ∈ [ψ] ∩ cc(x), we
have x ≤ y. Proceeding, take an arbitrary y ∈ [ψ] ∩ cc(x). It follows that y ∩ B = x ∩ B and that
ψ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1). So from ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ x we obtain ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ y. Now take an arbitrary Bψϕ ∈ y. It
follows from this and ¬Bψ¬x¯ ∈ y by (RM) that Bψ∧x¯ϕ ∈ y. Since ψ ∈ x ∩ C1, we have ` x¯→ ψ and
therefore it follows by (LE) that Bx¯ϕ ∈ y. Since x ∩ B = y ∩ B, we obtain Bx¯ϕ ∈ x. However, we
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saw in the argument for reflexivity that xx¯ ⊆ x, so it follows that ϕ ∈ x. That is, we have shown that
ψ ∈ (x∩ y ∩C1) and yψ ⊆ x. Hence x ≤ y. Since y ∈ [ψ]∩ cc(x) was chosen arbitrarily and x ∈ [ψ], it
follows that x ∈ min[ψ].
This completes the proof of the Minimality Lemma.
Truth Lemma: for each ϕ ∈ C1, we have [ϕ] = JϕKM . We prove this now. The proof is by induction on
the construction of formulas in C1. The induction base case and Boolean induction step cases are standard,
so we only consider the induction step case for formulas Bψϕ ∈ C1. Note: by the definition of C1, we have
Bψϕ ∈ C1 iff Bψϕ ∈ C0. Further, from Bψϕ ∈ C0, it follows by the definition of C0 that ψ ∈ C0 and ϕ ∈ C0.
• Induction step Bψϕ (left to right): if x ∈W and Bψϕ ∈ x ∩ C1, then M,x |= Bψϕ.
Assume Bψϕ ∈ x ∩ C1. If minJψK ∩ cc(x) = ∅, then, since M is well-founded, the result follows
immediately by Theorem 3.4. So assume minJψK∩ cc(x) 6= ∅ and take an arbitrary y ∈ minJψK∩ cc(x).
Applying the induction hypothesis, y ∈ min[ψ], from which it follows by the Minimality Lemma that
¬Bψ¬y¯ ∈ y. Since y ∈ cc(x) implies x ∩ B = y ∩ B, it follows that ¬Bψ¬y¯ ∈ x. It follows from this
by the assumption and (RM) that Bψ∧y¯ϕ ∈ x. Since ψ ∈ y ∩ C1, we have ` y¯ → ψ and therefore it
follows from Bψ∧y¯ϕ ∈ x by (LE) that By¯ϕ ∈ x. Since x∩B = y∩B, we have By¯ϕ ∈ y. But as we saw
that yy¯ ⊆ y in the argument for reflexivity, it follows that ϕ ∈ y and hence that y ∈ [ϕ]. Applying the
induction hypothesis, y ∈ JϕK. Since y ∈ minJψK ∩ cc(x) was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that
minJψK ∩ cc(x) ⊆ JϕK. Since M is well-founded, it follows by Theorem 3.4 that M,w |= Bψϕ.
• Induction step Bψϕ (right to left): if x ∈W , Bψϕ ∈ C1, and M,x |= Bψϕ, then Bψϕ ∈ x.
Assume Bψϕ ∈ C1 and M,x |= Bψϕ. Since M is well-founded, it follows by Theorem 3.4 that
minJψK ∩ cc(x) ⊆ JϕK. By the induction hypothesis, min[ψ] ∩ cc(x) ⊆ [ϕ]. We wish to prove that
Bψϕ ∈ x. We consider two cases.
Case: min[ψ] ∩ cc(x) = ∅. Since M is well-founded, it follows that [ψ] ∩ cc(x) = ∅. Toward a
contradiction, assume Bψ⊥ /∈ x. Now if xψ were not consistent, then there would exist {χ1, . . . , χn} ⊆
xψ such that ` (∧i≤n χi) → ⊥, from which it would follow by modal reasoning and the fact that
Bψχi ∈ x for each i ≤ n that Bψ⊥ ∈ x, contradicting our assumption that Bψ⊥ /∈ x. So xψ is
consistent after all, and we may extend this set to some y ∈ W . Since Bψψ ∈ x by (Succ), it follows
that ψ ∈ y and therefore that y ∈ [ψ]. But [ψ] ∩ cc(x) = ∅, and so we must have that y /∈ cc(x).
However, xψ ⊆ y, so it follows by the Agreement Lemma that x∩B = y∩B and hence xx¯∨y¯ = yx¯∨y¯. If
xx¯∨y¯ were not consistent, then there would exist {χ1, . . . , χn} ⊆ xx¯∨y¯ such that ` (
∧
i≤n χi)→ ⊥, from
which it would follow by modal reasoning and the fact that Bx¯∨y¯χi ∈ x for each i ≤ n that Bx¯∨y¯⊥ ∈ x,
from which we would obtain by (WCon) that ¬(x¯ ∨ y¯) ∈ x and hence that ¬x¯ ∈ x, a contradiction.
So xx¯∨y¯ = yx¯∨y¯ is consistent and so may be extended to some z ∈W . By (Succ), Bx¯∨y¯(x¯ ∨ y¯) ∈ x ∩ y
and therefore x¯ ∨ y¯ ∈ z. But then x¯ ∨ y¯ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ z ∩ C1), xx¯∨y¯ ⊆ z, and yx¯∨y¯ ⊆ z; that is, z ≤ x
and z ≤ y, from which it follows that y ∈ cc(x), a contradiction. Therefore our original assumption
that Bψ⊥ /∈ x must have been incorrect, and so we must have Bψ⊥ ∈ x after all. Applying modal
reasoning, we obtain Bψϕ ∈ x, as desired.
Case: min[ψ] ∩ cc(x) 6= ∅. It follows that there exists y ∈ min[ψ] ∩ cc(x). Toward a contradiction,
assume Bψϕ /∈ y. If yψ ∪ {¬ϕ} were not consistent, then we would have a finite {χ1, . . . , χn} ⊆ yψ
such that ` (∧i≤n χi)→ ϕ, from which it would follow by modal reasoning and the fact that Bψχi ∈ y
for each i ≤ n that Bψϕ ∈ y, contradicting the consistency of y by our assumption that Bψϕ /∈ y.
So yψ ∪ {¬ϕ} is indeed consistent and may be extended to some z ∈ W . Since we have Bψψ ∈ y by
(Succ), it follows that ψ ∈ z ∩ y ∩ C1. So since yψ ⊆ z, it follows that z ≤ y. But then z ≤ y, ψ ∈ z,
and y ∈ min[ψ]∩ cc(x), so it follows that z ∈ min[ψ]∩ cc(x). Since min[ψ]∩ cc(x) ⊆ [ϕ], it follows that
ϕ ∈ z. However, by the construction of z as a maximal consistent extension of yψ ∪{¬ϕ}, we also have
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¬ϕ ∈ z. So z is inconsistent, a contradiction. It follows that our assumption ¬Bψϕ ∈ y must have
been incorrect and therefore we must have Bψϕ ∈ y after all. Since y ∈ cc(x), we have x ∩B = y ∩B
and therefore that Bψϕ ∈ x, as desired.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. Since ¬θ ∈ wθ ∩ C1, it follows by the Truth Lemma that
M,wθ 6|= θ. But then we have shown that 0 θ implies M 6|= θ for our locally well-founded model M ∈ PL.
Applying Theorem 3.6, 0 θ implies 6|= ϕ. By contraposition, we have that |= θ implies ` θ. So completeness
obtains.
A.3 Results for AGM revision
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For (a), assume T ∈ BCPL is consistent. To say a S is maximal CPL-consistent means
that S ⊆ LCPL, S is consistent, and adding to S any ψ ∈ LCPL not already present would result in a set
that is inconsistent. We make tacit use of various well-known facts about maximal consistent sets. Let S
be the collection of all maximal CPL-consistent sets. Let {ψi}0<i<ω be an enumeration of LCPL. Define
ω+ := ω − {0} and S + ψ := CPL(S ∪ {ψ}). Take
W := {(S, 0) ∈ S× {0} | T ⊆ S} ∪
{(S, i) ∈ S× ω+ | ¬ψi ∈ T − CPL(∅) and CPL(ψi) ⊆ S} ,
≤ := {((S, i), (S′, i′)) ∈W ×W | i ≤ i′} ,
V := {((S, i), P ) ∈W × ℘(P) | P = S ∩P} ,
M := (W,≤, V ) .
Since T is consistent, it follows that there exists S ∈ S such that S ⊇ T , which implies (S, 0) ∈W . Therefore
W 6= ∅. Similarly, if i ∈ ω+ and ¬ψi ∈ CPL(T )− CPL(∅), then it follows that ψi is consistent and therefore
there exists S ∈ S such that S ⊇ CPL(ψi), which implies (S, i) ∈ W . The relation ≤ on W is a well-order
because the relation ≤ on ω is a well-order. So M is a well-ordered plausibility model.
Truth Lemma: for each ϕ ∈ LCPL and (S, i) ∈ W , we have M, (S, i) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ S. The proof is by
induction on the construction of ϕ ∈ LCPL. Induction base: if ϕ = ⊥, then ⊥ /∈ S since S is consistent and
M, (S, i) 6|= ⊥ by Definition 3.2. Induction base: if ϕ = p ∈ P, then the result follows by the definition of
V and Definition 3.2. Induction step: if ϕ = ϕ1 → ϕ2, then the result follows by the induction hypothesis
and Definition 3.2. The lemma follows.
Theory Lemma: for each ψ ∈ LCPL, we have
M↓ ∗M ψ =

T + ψ if ¬ψ /∈ T,
CPL(ψ) if ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅),
LCPL if ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅).
We prove this now by a case distinction. Proceeding, for each W ′ ⊆W , define
T (W ′) := {ϕ ∈ LCDL | ∀w ∈W ′ : M,w |= ϕ} .
• Case: ¬ψ /∈ T .
Let Sψ := {S ∈ S | S ⊇ T ∪ {ψ}}. It follows by the assumption of this case that Sψ 6= ∅ and hence
Sψ × {0} ⊆ W . By the Truth Lemma and the definition of ≤, it follows that minJψKM = Sψ × {0}.
Now notice that since S ∈ Sψ is maximal CPL-consistent, it follows that for each S′ ⊆ S we have
CPL(S′) ⊆ S. Therefore, since T ∪ {ψ} ⊆ S for each S ∈ Sψ, it follows that T + ψ ⊆ S for each
S ∈ Sψ. So T + ψ ⊆
⋂
Sψ. Now if we had some ϕ ∈
⋂
Sψ such that ϕ /∈ T + ψ, then it would
follow that ϕ /∈ CPL(T ∪{ψ}) and therefore we could extend T ∪{ψ,¬ϕ} to a maximal CPL-consistent
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S ∈ Sψ having ϕ /∈ S, contradicting the fact that ϕ ∈
⋂
Sψ. Therefore it must be the case that⋂
Sψ ⊆ T + ψ. Hence T + ψ =
⋂
Sψ. But then we have
T (Sψ × {0}) =
⋂
Sψ = T + ψ ,
where the leftmost equality follows by the Truth Lemma. Since minJψKM = Sψ × {0}, it follows by
the definition of ∗M that M↓ ∗M ψ = T + ψ.
• Case: ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅).
Define Sψ := {S ∈ S | ψ ∈ S}. It follows by the definition of W that there exists j ∈ ω+ and S ∈ Sψ
such that ψj = ψ and (S, j) ∈ W . So let i ∈ ω+ be the least positive integer satisfying the property
that there exists (S, i) ∈W with ψ ∈ S. By the Truth Lemma, the definition of ≤, and our choice of i,
it follows that minJψKM = Sψ ×{i}. Since S ∈ Sψ is maximal CPL-consistent, it follows that for each
S′ ⊆ S we have CPL(S′) ⊆ S. Therefore, since ψ ∈ S for each S ∈ Sψ, it follows that CPL(ψ) ⊆ S
for each S ∈ Sψ. So CPL(ψ) ⊆
⋂
Sψ. If we had some ϕ ∈
⋂
Sψ such that ϕ /∈ CPL(ψ), then we
could extend {ψ,¬ϕ} to a maximal CPL-consistent S ∈ Sψ having ϕ /∈ S, contradicting the fact that
ϕ ∈ ⋂Sψ. Therefore it must be the case that ⋂Sψ ⊆ CPL(ψ). Hence CPL(ψ) = ⋂Sψ. But then we
have
T (Sψ × {i}) =
⋂
Sψ = CPL(ψ) ,
where the leftmost equality follows by the Truth Lemma. Since minJψKM = Sψ × {i}, it follows by
the definition of ∗M that M↓ ∗M ψ = CPL(ψ).
• Case: ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅).
It follows from ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅) by the soundness of Classical Propositional Logic that 6|= ψ and therefore
minJψKM = ∅. Hence minJψKM ⊆ JϕKM for each ϕ ∈ LCPL. Applying the definition of ∗M , it follows
that M↓ ∗M ψ = LCPL.
The lemma follows.
We now prove that M is a Grove system for T . First, since M↓ = L0, it follows by the Theory Lemma
that M↓ = T . Second, we have already seen that M is a well-ordered plausibility model. So all that remains
is to prove that M↓ ∗M (−) satisfies the AGM revision postulates. So given an arbitrary ψ ∈ LCPL, we check
each postulate in turn.
• Closure: M↓ ∗M ψ = CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ).
By the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M ψ is either T +ψ, CPL(ψ), or LCPL. However, for each of these sets S,
we have CPL(S) = S.
• Success: ψ ∈M↓ ∗M ψ.
By the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M ψ is either T + ψ, CPL(ψ), or LCPL. However, each of these sets
contains ψ.
• Inclusion: M↓ ∗M ψ ⊆M↓ + ψ.
By the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M ψ is T + ψ if ¬ψ /∈ T , is CPL(ψ) if ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅), and is
LCPL if ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅). Further M↓ = T . Inclusion obviously follows for the case ¬ψ /∈ T . for the
case ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅), Inclusion follows because CPL(ψ) ⊆ T + ψ = CPL(T ∪ {ψ}). For the case
¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅), Inclusion follows because T + ψ = CPL(T ∪ {ψ}) = LCPL.
• Vacuity: if ¬ψ /∈M↓, then M↓ ∗M ψ = M↓ + ψ.
Since M↓ = T , the result follows by the Theory Lemma.
31
• Consistency: if ¬ψ /∈ CPL(∅), then ⊥ /∈ CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ).
If ¬ψ /∈ CPL(∅), then either ¬ψ /∈ T or ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅). Applying the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M ψ
is either T + ψ or CPL(ψ). Since T is consistent and we assumed ψ is consistent, each of T + ψ and
CPL(ψ) is consistent. Hence ⊥ /∈ CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ).
• Extensionality: if (ψ ↔ ψ′) ∈ CPL(∅), then M↓ ∗M ψ = M↓ ∗M ψ′.
Assume (ψ ↔ ψ′) ∈ CPL(∅). It follows that T + ψ = T + ψ′ and CPL(ψ) = CPL(ψ′). The result
therefore follows by the Theory Lemma.
• Superexpansion: M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ ϕ) ⊆ (M↓ ∗M ψ) + ϕ.
Case: ¬(ψ ∧ ϕ) /∈ T . By the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ ϕ) = T + (ψ ∧ ϕ). Since T is a theory, it
follows from the assumption of this case that ¬ψ /∈ T . Applying the Theory Lemma, M↓∗M ψ = T+ψ.
The result follows because
T + (ψ ∧ ϕ) = CPL(T ∪ {ψ ∧ ϕ}) = CPL(CPL(T ∪ {ψ}) ∪ {ϕ}) = (T + ψ) + ϕ .
Case: ¬(ψ∧ϕ) ∈ T −CPL(∅). By the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M (ψ∧ϕ) = CPL(ψ∧ϕ). If ¬ψ /∈ T , then
it follows by the Theory Lemma that M↓ ∗M ψ = T + ψ and hence
CPL(ψ ∧ ϕ) ⊆ CPL(T ∪ {ψ,ϕ}) = CPL(CPL(T ∪ {ψ}) ∪ {ϕ}) = (T + ψ) + ϕ .
And if ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅), then it follows by the Theory Lemma that M↓ ∗M ψ = CPL(ψ) and hence
CPL(ψ ∧ ϕ) = CPL({ψ} ∪ {ϕ}) = CPL(ψ) + ϕ. Finally, if ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅), then it follows by the Theory
Lemma that M↓ ∗M ψ = LCPL, from which we obtain
CPL(ψ ∧ ϕ) = LCPL = LCPL + ϕ .
Case: ¬(ψ ∧ϕ) ∈ CPL(∅). By the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ϕ) = LCPL. If ¬ψ /∈ T , then it follows
by the Theory Lemma that M↓ ∗M ψ = T +ψ; however, since ϕ∧ψ ∈ (T +ψ) +ϕ, it follows from the
assumption of the case that (T + ψ) + ϕ = LCPL, which implies the result. And if ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅),
then it follows by the Theory Lemma that M↓ ∗M ψ = CPL(ψ); however, since ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ CPL(ψ) + ϕ,
it follows from the assumption of the case that CPL(ψ) +ϕ = LCPL, which implies the result. Finally,
if ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅), then it follows by the Theory Lemma that M↓ ∗M ψ = LCPL and the result follows
because LCPL + ϕ = LCPL.
• Subexpansion: if ¬ϕ /∈ CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ), then (M↓ ∗M ψ) + ϕ ⊆M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ ϕ).
Suppose ¬ϕ /∈ CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ). We consider a few cases.
Case: ¬ψ /∈ T . By the Theory Lemma, CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ) = CPL(T +ψ) = T +ψ. If ¬(ψ∧ϕ) /∈ T , then
it follows by the Theory Lemma that M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ ϕ) = T + (ψ ∧ ϕ), from which we obtain the result
because
(T + ψ) + ϕ = CPL(CPL(T ∪ {ψ})∪ {ϕ}) = CPL(T ∪ {ψ} ∪ {ϕ}) = CPL(T ∪ {ψ ∧ ϕ}) = T + (ψ ∧ ϕ) .
And if ¬(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∈ T − CPL(∅), then we have (T + ψ) + ϕ = LCPL by the definition of +; however,
we originally assumed that ¬ϕ /∈ CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ) = T + ψ, which implies (T + ψ) + ϕ 6= LCPL, a
contradiction that allows us to conclude that the hypothesis ¬(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∈ T − CPL(∅) cannot obtain
under the assumption of this case. Finally, if ¬(ψ∧ϕ) ∈ CPL(∅), then it follows by the Theory Lemma
that M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ ϕ) = LCDL, which trivially implies the result.
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Case: ¬ψ ∈ T − CPL(∅). By the Theory Lemma, CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ) = CPL(CPL(ψ)) = CPL(ψ). Since
T is a theory, it follows from the assumption of this case that ¬(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∈ T − CPL(∅). Applying the
Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M (ψ ∧ ϕ) = CPL(ψ ∧ ϕ). But then the result follows because
CPL(ψ) + ϕ = CPL(CPL(ψ) ∪ {ϕ}) = CPL({ψ} ∪ {ϕ}) = CPL(ψ ∧ ϕ) .
Case: ¬ψ ∈ CPL(∅). By the Theory Lemma CPL(M↓ ∗M ψ) = CPL(LCPL) = LCPL. It follows from
the assumption of this case that ¬(ψ ∧ϕ) ∈ CPL(∅). Applying the Theory Lemma, M↓ ∗M ψ = LCPL.
The result follows.
Conclusion: M is a Grove system for T .
For (b), if T is inconsistent, then since M∗ is a system of spheres, it follows that T ∗ (−) = M↓∗ ∗M (−)
satisfies the AGM revision postulates. And if T is consistent, then since T ∗ψ = T ∗MT ψ and MT is a Grove
system for T , we have M↓ = T and that M is a system of spheres; therefore, T ∗MT (−) = T ∗ (−) satisfies
the AGM revision postulates. Conclusion: ∗ is an AGM revision operator.
A.4 Results for JCDL
Proof of Lemma 5.5. For this argument, a derivation is a JCDL-derivation. We wish to establish the follow-
ing result:
pi `nJCDL ϕ ⇒ ∃pi∗ ⊇ pi, pi∗ `0JCDL ϕ . (10)
The proof of (10), an adaptation of [3, Lemma 4.6] to the present setting, is by induction on n with a
sub-induction on the length |pi| of pi.
• Induction base: n = 0. Take pi∗ = pi.
• Induction step: assume the result holds for all m < n (this is the “induction hypothesis”), and prove
it holds for n by a sub-induction on |pi|.
Sub-induction base: |pi| = 1. Since pi contains a single line, ϕ is an axiom and therefore pi `0JCDL ϕ.
Take pi∗ = pi.
Sub-induction step: assume the result holds for all derivations pi′ having |pi′| < |pi| (this is the “sub-
induction hypothesis”), and prove it holds for pi. Proceeding, assume pi `nJCDL ϕ. If pi `0JCDL ϕ, we are
done. So let us assume further that pi 00JCDL ϕ. Therefore
pi = θ1, . . . , θ|pi|−1, ϕ
contains at least one troublesome necessitation. It follows that there exists a shortest prefix pi′ of pi
whose last line is a troublesome necessitation: we have
pi′ = θ1, . . . , θ|pi′|−1, B˙δθm
with |pi′| the minimum value such that B˙δθm neither is not a possibly necessitated axiom nor follows
from a previous line by (MP). We consider two cases.
Case: |pi′| < |pi|. By the sub-induction hypothesis, there exists pi′∗ ⊇ pi′ such that pi′∗ `0JCDL B˙δθm. Let σ
be the suffix of pi such that pi′σ = pi, where we have denoted sequence concatenation by juxtaposition.
Since pi′∗ is a derivation and pi′∗ ⊇ pi′, it follows that pi′∗σ is a derivation and this derivation has the
same last line as pi. Therefore, since we chose pi′ as the shortest prefix pi′ of pi whose last line is a
troublesome necessitation, we have pi′∗σ `n−1JCDL ϕ. Applying the induction hypothesis, it follows that
there exists a derivation pi∗ ⊇ pi′∗σ ⊇ pi′σ = pi such that pi∗ `0JCDL ϕ.
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Case: pi′ = pi. Hence ϕ = B˙δθm. Since the shortest prefix of pi whose last line is a troublesome
necessitation is pi itself, it follows that pi `1JCDL B˙δθm. But then θm is not a troublesome necessitation.
Moreover, θm is not a possibly necessitated axiom (since if it were, B˙
δθm would not be a troublesome
necessitation, contrary to our assumption implying that it is). So θm must follow by way of (MN) from
lines θn → θm and θn appearing earlier in pi than line m. That is,
pi = σ, θm, τ,Xθm
with both θn → θm and θn in σ
where σ and τ denote sequences of formulas (and we note that τ may be empty). By (eMN), we have
derivations
pi1 = σ, B˙δθn with |pi1| ≤ m < |pi|
pi2 = σ, B˙δ(θn → θm) with |pi2| ≤ m < |pi|
such that pi1 `1JCDL B˙δθn and pi2 `1JCDL B˙δ(θn → θm). Applying the sub-induction hypothesis to pi1
and to pi2, there exist pi1∗ ⊇ pi1 and pi2∗ ⊇ pi2 such that pi1∗ `0JCDL B˙δθn and pi2∗ `0JCDL B˙δ(θn → θm).
Recalling the abbreviation B˙δχ = cχ :
δχ and making use of an instance of (eK), the sequence
pi∗ = pi1∗, pi
2
∗, θm, τ,
B˙δ(θn → θm)→ (B˙δθn → (cθn→θm · cθn) :δθm),
B˙δθn → (cθn→θm · cθn) :δθm,
(cθn→θm · cθn) :δθm
is a derivation satisfying pi∗ ⊇ pi and pi∗ `0JCDL ϕ.
This completes the proof that (10) holds.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. In light of Lemma 5.5, to prove the statement of the present theorem, it suffices to
prove the following: if `0JCDL ϕ, then there exists a logical term t such that `0JCDL t :δϕ. This we prove by
induction on the length of derivation.
• Induction base and induction step for (eMN): ϕ is a possibly necessitated axiom. It follows that
`0JCDL cϕ :δϕ for the logical term cϕ.
• Induction step for (MP): we assume `0JCDL ϕ → ψ and `0JCDL ϕ along with the following “induction
hypothesis”: there exist logical terms t and s such that `0JCDL t :δ(ϕ → ψ) and `0JCDL s :δϕ. But then
it follows by the induction hypothesis, (eK), and two applications of (MP) that `0JCDL (t · s) :δψ for the
logical term t · s.
The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. For Item 1, we prove by induction on the length of derivation in JCDL from hypotheses
Γ that
Γ `JCDL ϕ implies Γ◦ `CDL ϕ◦ .
• Induction base for hypotheses: if ϕ ∈ Γ, then ϕ◦ ∈ Γ◦. So Γ◦ `CDL ϕ◦.
• Induction base for axioms: ϕ is an axiom. But for each axiom scheme (eX) of JCDL for which there is a
“matching” axiom scheme (X) of CDL, the forgetful projection of an instance of the JCDL axiom is an
instance of the matching CDL scheme. Regarding the three remaining JCDL schemes (eSum), (eCert),
and (eA) that have no matching CDL scheme: each of (eSum) and (eCert) is mapped to an instance
of the CDL-theorem p → p, and (eA) is mapped to an instance of the CDL-theorem q → (p → p).
Conclusion: Γ◦ `CDL ϕ◦.
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• Induction step for (MP): we assume the result holds for JCDL-theorems ϕ → ψ and ϕ derived from
hypotheses Γ, and we prove that Γ◦ `CDL ψ◦. By our assumption, ϕ◦ → ψ◦ and ϕ◦ are CDL-theorems
derived from hypotheses Γ◦. Applying (MP), ψ◦ as a CDL-theorem derived from hypotheses Γ◦.
• Induction step for (eMN): we assume the result holds for the JCDL-theorem ϕ derived from hypotheses
Γ, and we prove that the result holds for the JCDL-theorem B˙ψϕ derived from hypotheses Γ; that is,
we prove that Γ◦ `CDL (B˙ψϕ)◦. By our assumption, ϕ◦ is a CDL-theorem derived from hypotheses
Γ◦. Applying (MN) and the definition of the forgetful projection, Bψ◦ϕ◦ = (B˙ψϕ)◦ is a CDL-theorem
derived from hypotheses in Γ◦.
This completes the proof of Item 1. For Item 2, we by induction on the length of derivation in CDL from
hypotheses ∆ that
∆ `CDL ψ implies ∆t `JCDL ψt .
• Induction base for hypotheses: If ψ ∈ ∆, then ψt ∈ ∆t. So ∆t `CDL ψt.
• Induction base for axiom scheme: ψ is an axiom scheme of CDL, so we consider each possibility.
– (CL)t is an instance of (CL) and therefore a JCDL-derivable from hypotheses ∆t.
– (K)t is the scheme B˙γ
t
(ϕt1 → ϕt2)→ (B˙γ
t
ϕt1 → B˙γ
t
ϕt2). This has the form
B˙δ(χ1 → χ2)→ (B˙δχ1 → B˙δχ2) .
Applying (eK), we obtain
∆t `JCDL B˙δ(χ1 → χ2)→ (B˙δχ1 → (cχ1→χ2 · cχ1) :δχ2) .
Applying (eCert) and classical reasoning,
∆t `JCDL B˙δ(χ1 → χ2)→ (B˙δχ1 → B˙δχ2) .
That is, ∆t `JCDL (K)t.
– For X ∈ {Succ,RM, Inc,Comm,PI,NI}: (X)t is a schematic instance of (eX).
– Similar to the argument for (K)t:
∗ (KM)t follows by (eKM) and (eCert), and
∗ (WCon)t follows by (eWCon) and (eCert).
• Induction step for (MP): we assume the result holds for the CDL-theorems ϕ1 → ϕ2 and ϕ1 derived
from hypotheses ∆, and we prove the result holds for the CDL-theorem ϕ2 derived from hypothesis ∆.
By our assumption,
(ϕ1 → ϕ2)t = ϕt1 → ϕt2 and ϕt1
is a JCDL-theorem derivable from hypotheses ∆t. So it follows by (MN) that ϕt2 is a JCDL-theorem
derivable from hypotheses ∆t as well.
• Induction step for (MN): we assume the result holds for the CDL-theorem ϕ derived from hypotheses
∆, and we prove the result holds for the CDL-theorem Bγϕ derived from hypotheses ∆; that is, we
prove that ∆t `JCDL (Bγϕ)t. By our assumption, the formula ϕt is a JCDL-theorem derived from
hypotheses ∆t, but then it follows by (eMN) that B˙γ
t
ϕt = (B˙γϕ)t. is a JCDL-theorem derived from
hypotheses ∆t.
This completes the proof of Item 2.
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Proof of Theorem 5.19. This proof uses much of the work from the proof of Theorem 3.13 (the “old proof”).
In utilizing portions of the argument from the old proof in the present argument (the “new proof”), we
adopt the following conventions (the “JCDL-conventions”):
• the language (and set of formulas) is assumed to be LJCDL;
• occurrences of “B ” from the old proof are replaced by occurrences of “B˙ ”;
• truth or validity for CDL is replaced by truth or validity for JCDL;
• use of Theorem 3.4 or 3.4 is replaced by use of Theorem 5.16;
• use of Theorem 3.6 is replaced by Theorem 5.18;
• derivability in CDL is replaced by derivability in JCDL
• use of the non-subscripted turnstile ` denotes `JCDL;
• use of Theorem 3.11 is replaced by Theorem 5.11; and
• use of a derivable principle (X) of CDL (perhaps by tacit use of Theorem 3.11) is replaced by use of the
corresponding derivable principle (eX) of JCDL (with corresponding tacit use of Theorem 5.11 when
appropriate).
Having established the above JCDL-conventions and the “old/new proof” terminology, we proceed.
For soundness, we proceed by induction on the length of derivation. In the induction base, we must show
that each axiom scheme is valid. (CL) is straightforward, so we proceed with the remaining schemes. Let
(M,w) be an arbitrary well-ordered pointed Fitting model. We make tacit use of Theorems 2.3(3) and 5.15.
(eCert) is valid |= t :ψϕ→ B˙ψϕ.
Assume (M,w) satisfies t :ψϕ. Then w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and minJψK ⊆ JϕK. Applying Theorem 5.16, (M,w)
satisfies Bψϕ.
(eK) is valid: |= t :ψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ (s :ψϕ1 → (t · s):ψϕ2).
Assume (M,w) satisfies t :ψ(ϕ1 → ϕ2) and s :ψϕ1. Then w ∈ A(t, ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∩ A(s, ϕ1), minJψK ⊆Jϕ1 → ϕ2K, and minJψK ⊆ Jϕ1K. Hence minJψK ⊆ Jϕ2K and, by Application (Definition 5.12), w ∈
A(t · s, ϕ2). Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies (t · s):ψϕ2.
(eSum) is valid: |= (t :ψϕ ∨ s :ψϕ)→ (t+ s) :ψϕ.
Assume (M,w) satisfies t :ψϕ ∨ s :ψϕ. Then w ∈ A(t, ϕ) ∪ A(s, ϕ) and minJψK ⊆ JϕK. By Sum (Defini-
tion 5.12), w ∈ A(t+ s, ϕ). Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies (t+ s) :ψϕ.
(eSucc) is valid: |= B˙ψψ.
We have minJψK ⊆ JψK. Applying Theorem 5.16, (M,w) satisfies B˙ψψ.
(eKM) is valid: |= t :ψ⊥ → t :ψ∧ϕ⊥.
Assume (M,w) satisfies t :ψ⊥. Then w ∈ A(t,⊥) and minJψK ⊆ J⊥K. It follows from the latter by the
old proof that minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ J⊥K. Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies t :ψ∧ϕ⊥.
(eRM) is valid: |= ¬B˙ψ¬ϕ→ (t :ψχ→ t :ψ∧ϕχ).
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Assume (M,w) satisfies ¬B˙ψ¬ϕ and t :ψχ.
Since ¬B˙ψ¬ϕ = ¬c¬ϕ :ψ¬ϕ, it follows by Certification (Definition 5.12) that minJψK * JϕK. And it
follows from t :ψχ that w ∈ A(t, χ) and minJψK ⊆ JχK. By the old proof, we have by minJψK * JϕK and
minJψK ⊆ JχK that minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK. Since w ∈ A(t, χ), we conclude that (M,w) satisfies t :ψ∧ϕχ.
(eInc) is valid: |= t :ψ∧ϕχ→ B˙ψ(ϕ→ χ).
Suppose (M,w) satisfies t :ψ∧ϕχ. Then w ∈ A(t, χ) and minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK. It follows from the latter by
the old proof that minJψK ⊆ Jϕ→ χK. Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies B˙ψ(ϕ→ χ).
(eComm) is valid: |= t :ψ∧ϕχ→ t :ϕ∧ψχ.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies t :ψ∧ϕχ. Then w ∈ A(t, χ) and minJψ ∧ ϕK ⊆ JχK. Hence minJϕ ∧ ψK ⊆ JχK.
Conclusion: (M,w) satisfies t :ϕ∧ψχ.
(ePI) is valid: |= t :ψχ→ B˙ϕ(t :ψχ).
Suppose (M,w) satisfies t :ψχ. Then w ∈ A(t, χ) and minJψK ⊆ JχK. The latter implies that (M,v)
satisfies B˙ψχ for any given v ∈ W . Since M is well-ordered, we have v ∈ cc(w) for each v ∈ W , and
therefore it follows from w ∈ A(t, χ) by Admissibility Indefeasibility (Definition 5.12) that A(t, χ) = W .
But then for each v ∈ W , we have v ∈ A(t, χ) and M, v |= B˙ψχ. Applying Theorem 5.14, we have for
each v ∈ W that M,v |= t :ψχ. Therefore, Jt :ψχK = W , from which it follows that minJϕK ⊆ Jt :ψχK.
Applying Theorem 5.16, we conclude that (M,w) satisfies B˙ϕ(t :ψχ).
(eNI) is valid: |= ¬t :ψχ→ B˙ϕ(¬t :ψχ).
Suppose (M,w) satisfies ¬t :ψχ. Then w /∈ A(t, ϕ) or minJψK * JχK.
Case: w /∈ A(t, ϕ). Since M is well-ordered, we have v ∈ cc(w) for each v ∈ W , and so it follows from
w /∈ A(t, ϕ) by Admissibility Indefeasibility (Definition 5.12) that A(t, ϕ) = ∅. Therefore, J¬t :ψχK = W ,
from which it follows that minJϕK ⊆ J¬t :ψχK. Applying Theorem 5.16, we conclude that (M,w) satisfies
B˙ϕ(¬t :ψχ).
Case: minJψK * JχK. It follows that M, v |= ¬t :ψχ for each v ∈ cc(w) = W . Therefore, J¬t :ψχK = W ,
from which it follows that minJϕK ⊆ J¬t :ψχK. Applying Theorem 5.16, we conclude that (M,w) satisfies
B˙ϕ(¬t :ψχ).
(eWCon) is valid: |= t :ψ⊥ → ¬ψ.
Suppose (M,w) satisfies t :ψ⊥. By the old proof, J¬ψK = W . So (M,w) satisfies ¬ψ.
(eA) is valid: |= t :ψϕ→ (B˙χϕ→ t :χϕ).
Suppose (M,w) satisfies t :ψϕ and B˙χϕ. Then w ∈ A(t, ϕ) and minJχK ⊆ JϕK. Conclusion: (M,w)
satisfies t :χϕ.
This completes the induction base. For the induction step, we must show that validity is preserved under
the rules of (MP) and (eMN). The argument for (MP) is standard, so let us focus on (eMN). We assume |= ϕ
for the JCDL-derivable ϕ (this is the “induction hypothesis”), and we prove that |= B˙ψϕ. Proceeding, since
|= ϕ, it follows that JϕK = W and hence that minJψK ⊆ JϕK. By Certification (Definition 5.12, A(cϕ, ϕ) = W .
But then (M,w) satisfies cϕ :
ψϕ = B˙ψϕ. Soundness has been proved.
Since JCDL is sound with respect to the class of well-ordered Fitting models we note that JCDL is
consistent (i.e., 0JCDL ⊥). In particular, take any pointed Fitting model (M,w) containing only the single
world w. It is simple to construct such a model: take
M := ({w}, {(w,w)}, {(w, ∅)}, A) ,
37
where A is the “total” admissibility function defined by setting A(t, ϕ) := W for all (t, ϕ) ∈ TJCDL×LJCDL.
It is obvious that the requisite properties from Definition 5.12 obtain. Since there is only one world, M is
well-ordered. Further, by soundness, we have that `JCDL ϕ implies M,w |= ϕ. Therefore, since M,w 6|= ⊥
by Definition 5.13, it follows that 0JCDL ⊥. That is, JCDL is consistent. We make use of this fact tacitly in
what follows.
For completeness, take a formula θ such that 0 ¬θ. Define consistency, inconsistency, maximal consis-
tency in (“maxcons in”) a set of formulas, the set sub(ϕ) of subformulas of ϕ (including ϕ itself), the set
sub(S) containing all subformulas of each formula in the set S (including the formulas themselves), and the
Boolean closure ⊕S as in the old proof (but of course using the JCDL-conventions). For a set S of formulas,
we define:
~BS := S ∪ {B˙ψϕ | t :ψϕ ∈ S} ,
±S := S ∪ {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ S} ,
B˙0S := S ,
B˙i+1S := ±{B˙ψϕ | ψ ∈ S and ϕ ∈ B˙iS} ,
B˙ωS :=
⋃
0<i<ω B˙iS ,
C0 := ± ~B sub({θ,⊥,>}) ,
C1 := ⊕C0 ,
B˙ := B˙ωC1 ,
C := C1 ∪ B˙ ,
T0 := ±{t :ψϕ ∈ LJCDL | t :ψϕ ∈ C0} .
Key differences from the old proof:
• the new operator ~BS adds the “certified version” B˙ψϕ = cϕ :ψϕ of each formula t :ψϕ in S,
• C0 has been changed by adding the operator ~B,
• every “B ” in the old proof has been replaced by “B˙ ”,
• we use the JCDL-conventions (e.g., we are working in the language of JCDL), and
• the set T0 (used later) is new.
We then define:
W := {x ⊆ C | x is maxcons in C} ,
x¯ :=
∧
(x ∩ C0) for x ∈W ,
xψ := {ϕ | B˙ψϕ ∈ x} for x ∈W and ψ ∈ C1 ,
≤ := {(x, y) ∈W ×W | ∃ψ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1), yψ ⊆ x} ,
V (x) :=P ∩ x for x ∈W ,
xˆ :=
∧
(x ∩ T0) for x ∈W ,
A(t, ϕ) := {x ∈W | ∃ψ ∈ LJCDL, ` xˆ→ t :ψϕ} ,
M := (W,≤, V, A) .
Key differences from the old proof:
• every “B ” in the old proof has been replaced by “B˙ ”,
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• the mapping taking a world x ∈W to a formula xˆ is new,
• the function A of type (TJCDL ×LJCDL)→ ℘(W ) is new, and
• M has been expanded to contain A.
The arguments in the old proof (modulo the JCDL-conventions) are used to prove W is finite and
nonempty, ≤ is reflexive and transitive, ≤ is total on each connected component, and ≤ is well-founded. We
prove the following result particular to the new proof:
y ∈ cc(x) ⇒ (∀t :ψϕ ∈ C1, t :ψϕ ∈ x iff t :ψϕ ∈ y) . (11)
Proceeding, suppose y ∈ cc(x). Since ≤ is total on each connected component, we may assume without
loss of generality that x ≤ y. (The case where y ≤ x is argued similarly.) Now x ≤ y implies there exists
δ ∈ (x ∩ y ∩ C1) such that yδ ⊆ x. For the left-to-right direction: suppose t :ψϕ ∈ x ∩ C1. If we had
t :ψϕ /∈ y, then it would follow by maximal consistency that ¬t :ψϕ ∈ y, hence B˙δ(¬t :ψϕ) ∈ y by (eNI),
hence ¬t :ψϕ ∈ x by yδ ⊆ x, thereby contradicting the consistency of x. So it must be the case that t :ψϕ ∈ y
after all. Now for the right-to-left direction: suppose t :ψϕ ∈ y ∩ C1. It follows by (ePI) that B˙δ(t :ψϕ) ∈ y.
Since yδ ⊆ x, we obtain t :ψϕ ∈ x. So (11) indeed obtains.
In order to conclude that M is a Fitting model, we must prove that A satisfies the properties required
of an admissibility function (Definition 5.12). We state and prove these in turn.
• Certification: A(cϕ, ϕ) = W .
Take an arbitrary x ∈ W . We have ` xˆ → B˙ϕϕ by (Succ). Since B˙ϕϕ = cϕ :ϕϕ, it follows that
` xˆ → cϕ :ϕϕ. Applying the definition of A, we obtain x ∈ A(cϕ, ϕ). Since x ∈ W was chosen
arbitrarily, we conclude that A(cϕ, ϕ) = W .
• Application: A(t, ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∩A(s, ϕ1) ⊆ A(t · s, ϕ2).
Assume x ∈ A(t, ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∩ A(s, ϕ1). Applying the definition of A, this means there exists ψ1 ∈
LJCDL and ψ2 ∈ LJCDL such that ` xˆ → t :ψ1(ϕ1 → ϕ2) and ` xˆ → s :ψ2ϕ1. Now we have each of
` Bϕ1∧ϕ2(ϕ1 → ϕ2) and ` Bϕ1∧ϕ2ϕ1 by (Succ) and modal reasoning. So it follows that
` xˆ→ t :ψ1(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧Bϕ1∧ϕ2(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ s :ψ2ϕ1 ∧Bϕ1∧ϕ2ϕ1 .
Applying (eA), we obtain
` xˆ→ t :ϕ1∧ϕ2(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ s :ϕ1∧ϕ2ϕ1 ,
from which it follows by (eK) that ` xˆ→ (t · s) :ϕ1∧ϕ2ϕ2. Applying the definition of A, it follows that
x ∈ A(t · s, ϕ2).
• Sum: A(t, ϕ) ∪A(s, ϕ) ⊆ A(t+ s, ϕ).
Suppose x ∈ A(t, ϕ) ∪ A(s, ϕ). Applying the definition of A, this means there exists ψt ∈ LJCDL such
that ` xˆ→ t :ψtϕ or there exists ψs ∈ LJCDL such that ` xˆ→ s :ψsϕ. Applying (eSum), it follows that
` xˆ→ (t+s) :ψϕ for some ψ ∈ {ψt, ψs}. But then we obtain by the definition of A that x ∈ A(t+s, ϕ).
• Admissibility Indefeasibility: if x ∈ A(t, ϕ) and y ∈ cc(x), then y ∈ A(t, ϕ).
Suppose x ∈ A(t, ϕ) and y ∈ cc(x). It follows from x ∈ A(t, ϕ) by the definition of A that there exists
ψ ∈ LJCDL such that ` xˆ → t :ψϕ. But y ∈ cc(x), and so it follows by (11) that yˆ = xˆ. Therefore
` yˆ → t :ψϕ, from which it follows by the definition of A that y ∈ A(t, ϕ).
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So A satisfies the properties required of an admissibility function.
Since W is nonempty, A satisfies the properties of an admissibility function, and ≤ is a locally well-
ordered, it follows that M is a locally well-ordered Fitting model. The arguments in the old proof (modulo
the JCDL-conventions) are then used to prove that the Consistency Lemma holds and that the Minimality
Lemma holds.
By the old proof (modulo the JCDL-conventions), all of the induction base and step cases of the Truth
Lemma hold, except for the induction step case for formulas t :ψϕ. What remains is to check this remaining
case. Before we do this, note: by the definition of C1 as the Boolean closure of C0, it follows from t :
ψϕ ∈ C1
that t :ψϕ ∈ C0 and therefore t :ψϕ ∈ T0. We now proceed with the argument.
• Induction step t :ψϕ (left to right): if x ∈W and t :ψϕ ∈ x ∩ C1, then M,x |= t :ψϕ.
Assume t :ψϕ ∈ x ∩ C1. By (eCert) and the definition of C1, it follows that B˙ψϕ ∈ x ∩ C1. Using the
old proof (modulo the JCDL-conventions and using Theorem 5.16 in place of Theorem 3.4), we obtain
M,x |= B˙ψϕ. Also, since t :ψϕ ∈ x∩C1 implies t :ψϕ ∈ x∩ T0, it follows that ` xˆ→ t :ψϕ, from which
we obtain x ∈ A(t, ϕ) by the definition of A. So since x ∈ A(t, ϕ) and M,x |= B˙ψϕ, it follows by
Theorem 5.14 that M,x |= t :ψϕ.
• Induction step t :ψϕ (right to left): if x ∈W , t :ψϕ ∈ C1, and M,x |= t :ψϕ, then t :ψϕ ∈ x.
Assume t :ψϕ ∈ C1 and M,x |= t :ψϕ. By Theorem 5.14, it follows that M,x |= B˙ψϕ and x ∈ A(t, ϕ).
Using the old proof (modulo the JCDL-conventions and using Theorem 5.16 in place of Theorem 3.4),
it follows from M,x |= B˙ψϕ that B˙ψϕ ∈ x. Applying the definition of A, it follows from x ∈ A(t, ϕ)
that there exists χ ∈ LJCDL such that ` xˆ → t :χϕ. But then we have ` xˆ → t :χϕ ∧ B˙ψϕ. Applying
(eA), we obtain ` xˆ → t :ψϕ. Since t :ψϕ ∈ C1 implies t :ψϕ ∈ T0, it follows from ` xˆ → t :ψϕ by the
maximal consistency of x in C ⊇ T0 that t :ψϕ ∈ x.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. We then apply the argument as in the old proof (modulo
the JCDL-conventions and using Theorem 5.18 in place of Theorem 3.6) to conclude that JCDL is complete
with respect to the class of well-ordered Fitting models.
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